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While scholars frequently offer ideology as a primary
explanation for judicial behavior, judges, and some scholars,
emphasize the importance of collegiality on multimember
courts. But there is disagreement over how to determine when
collegiality is at work, and what type of multimember court is
more likely to exhibit collegiality among its judges. Resolving
these competing claims calls for a valid measure of
collegiality.
This Article develops novel measures of collegiality based
on dissenting judges’ expressions of collegiality towards
judges in the majority. It uses judge-level and court-level
databases to validate these measures by showing that the
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novel measures correlate with some, but not other, measures
of dissent aversion—a feature of multimember courts that
commentators see as aligned with collegiality.
The Article then investigates empirically settings where
judges tend to act collegially and the characteristics of courts
that tend to be collegial. Analysis reveals that collegiality is
not associated with ideological homogeneity and is more
likely to be found in published opinions; that the Supreme
Court is more collegial than are the courts of appeals; and
that collegiality is less likely to be found on courts with large
complements of judges, and on courts with chambers spread
across more courthouses.
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INTRODUCTION
The dominant view among legal scholars is that ideology
drives judicial decision-making. 1 Political scientists, too,
have found evidence that ideology plays an important role in
how judges decide cases. 2 Scholars in both fields have found
that the ideological makeup of multi-judge panels often
affects the outcomes of cases.
Yet another school of thought—advanced perhaps most
prominently by Judge Harry Edwards, now a Senior Judge
on the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit and a former chief judge of that court—
argues that this scholarship ignores the important role that
judicial collegiality plays in judicial decision-making. 3 Along
with Professor Michael Livermore, Judge Edwards has more
recently upped the ante in the debate, arguing that empirical
studies of judicial decision-making ignore the influence of
collegiality on the behavior of judges. 4 Judge Edwards
1. See, e.g., FRANK B. CROSS, DECISION MAKING IN THE U.S. COURTS OF
APPEALS 27–29 (2007) (criminal justice); Cass R. Sunstein, David Schkade & Lisa
Michelle Ellman, Ideological Voting on Federal Courts of Appeals: A Preliminary
Investigation, 90 VA. L. REV. 301, 319–21, 324–25 (2004) (employment
discrimination); Thomas J. Miles & Cass R. Sunstein, The New Legal Realism,
75 U. CHI. L. REV. 831, 842 (2008) (administrative law); Richard L. Revesz,
Environmental Regulation, Ideology, and the D.C. Circuit, 83 VA. L. REV. 1717,
1717–19 (1997) (environmental law); Sunstein et al., supra, at 322–23 (same);
Banks Miller & Brett Curry, Expertise, Experience, and Ideology on Specialized
Courts: The Case of the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, 43 LAW & SOC’Y
REV. 839, 855–57 (2009) (finding evidence of ideological voting in patent cases at
the Federal Circuit).
2. The view is most closely associated with Professors Jeffrey Segal and
Harold Spaeth. See JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT
AND THE ATTITUDINAL MODEL REVISITED 6 (2002); infra notes 21–22 and
accompanying text.
3. See Harry T. Edwards, Collegiality and Decision Making on the D.C.
Circuit, 84 VA. L. REV. 1335, 1335 (1998) [hereinafter Edwards, Collegiality and
Decision Making]; Harry T. Edwards, The Effects of Collegiality on Judicial
Decision Making, 151 U. PA. L. Rev. 1639, 1645 (2003) [hereinafter Edwards,
Effects of Collegiality].
4. Harry T. Edwards & Michael A. Livermore, Pitfalls of Empirical Studies
That Attempt to Understand the Factors Affecting Appellate Decisionmaking, 58
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asserts that collegial judges “are willing to listen, persuade,
and be persuaded, all in an atmosphere of civility and
respect.” 5 Along similar lines, the late Judge Frank Coffin,
formerly of the United States Court of Appeals for the First
Circuit, describes collegial judges as having “respect for the
strengths of others,” and the common goal of “excellence in
the court’s decision.” 6 Former Tenth Circuit Judge Deanell
Reece Tacha asserts that “judicial collegiality enhances the
quality of appellate decisionmaking.” 7 She similarly
describes “collegiality on an appellate court” as “knowing my
fellow judges so well, and respecting their intellects and work
patterns so much, that I am willing to listen and consider
carefully their perspectives on each legal issue that we
confront.” 8 Tenth Circuit Judge Michael Murphy explains
that “a collegial court better manifests the bedrock principle
upon which appellate courts rest: multiple minds are better
than one.” 9 Fourth Circuit Judge Pamela Harris describes
judicial collegiality as “knowing each other, really respecting
each other and knowing each other’s views, being willing to
be persuaded and also to persuade; to be part of a robust,
deliberative process.” 10 And Professor Stephen Wasby mines
interviews with judges who have sat on the Ninth Circuit to
conclude that “a collegial court is a ‘cohesive,’ ‘friendly,’
‘warm group’ of people, . . . one in which the judges have
‘mutual respect’ and ‘understanding’ for each other and
DUKE L.J. 1895, 1917–18 (2009).
5. Edwards, Effects of Collegiality, supra note 3, at 1645.
6. FRANK M. COFFIN, ON APPEAL: COURTS, LAWYERING,
(1994).

AND

JUDGING 215

7. Deanell Reece Tacha, The “C” Word: On Collegiality, 56 OHIO ST. L.J. 585,
586 (1995).
8. Id. at 587.
9. Michael R. Murphy, Collegiality and Technology, 2 J. APP. PRAC. &
PROCESS 455, 456 (2000).
10. Maura Levine, Inside the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals: How
Collegiality Works, UNIV. OF CHI. L. SCH. (May 19, 2016), https://www.law
.uchicago.edu/news/inside-fourth-circuit-court-appeals-how-collegiality-works
(describing talk by Fourth Circuit Judge Pamela Harris).
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maintain friendship across ideological lines.” 11
The divide over collegiality extends to debate over which
courts (or types of courts) are likely to be more collegial.
Professors Frank Cross and Emerson Tiller argue that
features of the Supreme Court make it more likely to
function collegially than the courts of appeals: The Justices
of the Supreme Court sit together on virtually all cases; they
collectively select the cases they hear; and the impulse to act
individually is mitigated by “‘the need to act collectively in
order to be effective.’” 12 In contrast, Judge Edwards argues
in a working paper that features of the courts of appeals
make those courts more likely to function collegially than the
Supreme Court. He notes that, as compared to the courts of
appeals, the Supreme Court hears far fewer cases; hears
more complex and contested cases; publishes all its decisions;
can decline to hear some cases; and issues many cases with
multiple Justices weighing in with separate opinions. 13
In order to resolve these competing claims over the role
and importance of judicial collegiality—and also to resolve
competing claims as to which courts are more collegial—one
must have a valid way to measure the phenomenon. But the
proper way to measure judicial collegiality is itself contested.

11. Stephen L. Wasby, Communication in the Ninth Circuit: A Concern for
Collegiality, 11 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 73, 76 (1987) (footnote omitted) (quoting
unattributed interviews with judges). See also Patricia M. Wald, Collegiality on
a Court: Its Practices, Problems, and Pitfalls, 40 FED. B. NEWS & J. 521, 524 (1993)
(“I found that one of the most important things in running an appellate court was
maintaining an atmosphere in which judges can agree or disagree on substance
free of personality clashes or risk of personal reprisal.”); DONALD R. SONGER,
SUSAN W. JOHNSON, C.L. OSTBERG & MATTHEW E. WETSTEIN, LAW, IDEOLOGY, AND
COLLEGIALITY: JUDICIAL BEHAVIOUR IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CANADA 66 (2012)
(reporting similar quotations from interviews with Canadian Supreme Court
Justices).
12. Frank B. Cross & Emerson H. Tiller, Understanding Collegiality on the
Court, 10 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 257, 259 (2008) (quoting Linda Greenhouse, The
Court: Same Time Next Year. And Next Year, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 6, 2002, at C3).
13. See Harry T. Edwards, Collegial Decision Making in the US Courts of
Appeals 6 (N.Y.U. Sch. of L. Pub. L. & Legal Theory Res. Paper Series Working
Paper No. 17-47).
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Judge Edwards has emphasized the unanimity with which
the federal courts of appeals (including the court on which he
sits) decide cases. 14 On this logic, collegiality drives judges to
vote against their ideological preferences. However, as others
have pointed out, judges may vote against their ideological
preferences—and, specifically, choose to form majority blocs
or to issue unanimous opinions—for reasons other than
collegiality.
Professors Cross and Tiller suggest a few measures of
collegiality. For one thing, one might look at how a judge’s
ideological voting patterns change over time as new judges
join (and other judges leave) a court, on the logic that certain
judges might collegially attract (or uncollegially repel) the
judge to (or from) their viewpoints. 15 For another, “evidence
of collegiality (or lack thereof) could be found in the
willingness to issue separate opinions, such as concurrences,
even in the event of outcome agreement.” 16 Finally, one could
(though the data challenges are daunting) examine voting
fluidity—cases where a judge changed his or her vote over
the course of hearing and deciding particular cases. 17 In the
end, however, they concede that the “Edwards/Coffin
concept” of collegiality is “difficult to measure or model.” 18
Judge Edwards has tried to marshal empirical evidence
of unanimity of decision on the federal courts of appeals to
14. See id. at 20–21; see also SONGER ET AL., supra note 11, at 92, 153–55
(noting arguments that collegiality contributes to unanimous decision-making on
the Supreme Court of Canada).
15. See Cross & Tiller, supra note 12, at 260.
16. Id. Judge Patricia Wald suggested that concurrences may be more
threatening to judicial collegiality than dissents. See Patricia M. Wald, The
Rhetoric of Results and the Results of Rhetoric: Judicial Writings, 62 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1371, 1413 (1995) (“Though certainly not as threatening as dissents,
concurrences raise more collegial eyebrows, for in writing separately on a matter
where the judge thinks the majority got the result right, she may be thought to
be self-indulgent, single-minded, even childish in her insistence that everything
be done her way.”).
17. See Cross & Tiller, supra note 12, at 260.
18. Id. at 271.
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argue that these courts decide cases collegially. 19 Yet there
are reasons—such as the prevalence of “panel effects”—to
doubt that deciding substantial numbers of cases
unanimously, necessarily reflects a high degree of
collegiality. 20
This Article accepts the challenges of measuring the
“Edwards/Coffin concept” of collegiality. It does so by
focusing not on the direction of judges’ votes, but rather on
the way judges treat one another precisely when there is
disagreement. Returning to the emphasis of Judges Edwards
and Coffin on “respect,” the measure asks whether
dissenting judges treat the judges in the majority (and their
opinions) with respect.
The Article uses this measure of collegiality to begin to
shed empirical light on the collegial practices of judges and
courts. With respect to individual judges’ practices, the
evidence shows first that dissenting judges are more likely to
express collegiality in cases that are to be published as
opposed to unpublished.
Second, the data shows that any ideological divide
between the majority judges and dissenting judges does not
prompt dissenting judges to the extent to which they express
collegiality. One might think that a dissenting judge with an
ideological orientation different from the judges in the
majority might be less likely to express collegiality, because
those differences presumably are grounded in fundamental
beliefs. Alternatively, one might think that such a dissenting
judge would be more likely to express collegiality in order to
dispel public expectations that ideological distinctions
among judges draw into question the accuracy and
legitimacy of judicial decision making. The evidence,
however, supports neither of these views.
Third, the data reveals no difference in the expression of

19. See Edwards, supra note 13, at 22–23.
20. See infra Part I.
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collegiality based on the gender of the dissenting judge.
Research suggesting that women generally tend to be more
cooperative might suggest that female dissenting judges
would be more likely to express collegiality. The evidence,
however, does not support that conclusion.
Finally, the evidence shows that judges sitting by
designation on a court of appeals panel are (i) more likely to
express collegiality than judges not sitting by designation,
but (ii) less likely to express collegiality in more than one
way. This suggests that judges sitting by designation may
express collegiality more out of “obligation” than out of
deeper feelings of respect. On reflection, this conclusion that
is not surprising given the likelihood that judges sitting by
designation are not very familiar with their co-panelists, and
do not have—nor are likely to perceive the need to
establish—long-term working relationships with their copanelists.
The Article next examines empirically the “comparative
collegiality” of courts. First, contrary to Judge Edwards’
assertion, the evidence shows that the Supreme Court is
more collegial than are the federal courts of appeals.
With respect to relative collegiality of the regional
federal courts of appeals, the evidence reveals that
collegiality will more commonly be practiced on courts with
fewer judges housed in fewer courthouses. On the other
hand, the evidence does not support the notion that courts
with lower dissent rates will be more collegial, or that courts
that include more rural areas—or that include areas with
residents whom commentators sometimes characterize as
“more polite”—will be more collegial.
The Article proceeds as follows. Part II explicates
divergent conceptions of judicial collegiality, and discusses
incentives and disincentives to behave collegially. Part III
introduces dissent as a felicitous setting in which to study
collegiality. It discusses when a judge will choose to dissent
and when, assuming the judge will dissent, she will express
collegiality toward the majority.
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Part IV develops the measures of collegiality in the
context of dissent. It explains the novel databases I
assembled to effectuate the measures. It then shows that the
measures have scientific validity.
Part V present the core empirical analysis. It develops
hypotheses—at the judge level, comparatively with respect
to the Supreme Court and federal courts of appeals, and
comparatively across the regional courts of appeals—and
tests them empirically. Part VI discusses the findings and
their ramifications.
I.

THEORIZING JUDICIAL COLLEGIALITY

In this Part, I first survey the divergent theoretical
understandings of judicial collegiality. I then turn to
incentives and disincentives for judges to behave collegially.
A. Divergent Theoretical
Collegiality

Understandings

of

Judicial

Political science’s focus on ideologically driven voting
reached an apex with Professors Jeffrey Segal and Harold
Spaeth’s exposition of the attitudinal model. 21 Segal and
Spaeth hypothesized that judges (at least judges, like federal
Article III judges, who enjoy lifetime tenure)—vote their
ideological and policy preferences in disposing of cases. They
offered some data in support of their hypothesis, in the
context of votes cast by Justices on the United States
Supreme Court. 22
In the years since, commentators have argued that Segal
and Spaeth overstated the applicability of the model, in
particular arguing that the attitudinal model has less
application in the context of lower courts. The Supreme
Court Justices have no judicial overseer; 23 a majority
21. See SEGAL & SPAETH, supra note 2, at 86.
22. See id. at 321–23.
23. In the wake of Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), federal
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decision of the Supreme Court may only be overridden by a
subsequent Court decision, 24 congressional action (with
respect to a statutory holding), and constitutional
amendment (with respect to a constitutional holding). As
such, Supreme Court Justices have little incentive, the
argument goes, to vote other than in line with their own
preferences. 25 In contrast, judges on lower courts are more
likely to consider other factors—not least the fact that they
are subject to reversal by higher tribunals—in deciding how
to cast their votes and draft opinions. 26
Nevertheless, commentators have found evidence of
ideological voting at the level of the U.S. courts of appeals—
the intermediate appellate courts in the federal judiciary. 27
courts (including the Supreme Court) are supposed to decide questions of state
law the way that the relevant state high court would decide those questions.
24. The Court’s freedom to overrule one of its earlier decisions is legally
subject to the doctrine of stare decisis. See Kimble v. Marvel Ent., LLC, 576 U.S.
446, 455 (2015); e.g., Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 854–
869 (1992) (concluding that stare decisis required reaffirmance of the holding in
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973)). Still, the Court has characterized stare decisis
as “a ‘principle of policy,’ . . . and not as an ‘inexorable command.’” Seminole Tribe
of Fla. v. Fla., 517 U.S. 44, 63 (1996) (quoting Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U.S. 106,
119 (1940) and Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 828 (1991)). And some
commentators argue that the doctrine is so malleable that it imposes very little
constraint on outcomes. See, e.g., Henry Paul Monaghan, Stare Decisis and
Constitutional Adjudication, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 723, 743 (1988) (“Because a
coherent rationale for the intermittent invocation of stare decisis has not been
forthcoming, the impression is created that the doctrine is invoked only as a mask
hiding other considerations.”); Charles J. Cooper, Stare Decisis: Precedent and
Principle in Constitutional Adjudication, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 401, 402 (1988)
(“[S]tare decisis has always been a doctrine of convenience, to both conservatives
and liberals.”).
25. Some commentators question this point, suggesting that Supreme Court
Justices vote “strategically,” taking into account the likely reaction of the political
branches to a decision with an eye to obtaining a final outcome closest to their
(the Justices’) own preferences. See, e.g., LEE EPSTEIN & JACK KNIGHT, THE
CHOICE JUSTICES MAKE 9–18 (1998); FORREST MALTZMAN, JAMES F. SPRIGGS II &
PAUL J. WAHLBECK., CRAFTING LAW ON THE SUPREME COURT: THE COLLEGIAL GAME
4 (2000).
26. See, e.g., Jonathan Remy Nash & Rafael I. Pardo, Rethinking the
Principal-Agent Theory of Judging, 99 IOWA L. REV. 331, 336 (2013).
27. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
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In particular, commentators examining decision-making by
multi-judge panels suggests that lower court judges are
swayed by the ideology of other judges who serve on panels
with them. Dean Richard Revesz first identified what has
come to be known as “panel effects” in an examination of
voting in environmental cases by judges on the United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. 28 He
found that “the party affiliation of the other judges on [a]
panel has a greater bearing on a judge’s vote than his or her
own affiliation.” 29
Dean Revesz’s 1997 initial study of panel effects drew a
strongly critical response from Judge Harry Edwards. 30 He
argued that Dean Revesz’s data “surely do not convincingly
show that ‘ideology’ broadly influences decision making,” but
rather, “are consistent with the view that collegiality is alive
and well in judicial decision making on the D.C. Circuit.” 31
The debate developed into a colloquy. 32 More recently, Judge
Edwards—with Professor Michael Livermore—has taken on
empirical judicial studies scholars more generally. 33 Judge
Edwards and Professor Livermore argue that “[t]he effects of
collegiality and interjudge deliberations are not accounted
for in the attitudinal model of judging.” 34 They further point
out that none of the scholars who have found evidence of
“panel effects” on courts of appeals have “investigated
whether these panel effects are the result of genuine judicial
deliberations or “strategic voting” on the part of the
judges.” 35 Finally, writing for himself, Judge Edwards

28. See Revesz, supra note 1.
29. Id. at 1719. See id. at 1760–64.
30. See Edwards, Collegiality and Decision Making, supra note 3.
31. Id. at 1336.
32. See Richard L. Revesz, Ideology, Collegiality, and the D.C. Circuit: A Reply
to Chief Judge Harry Edwards, 85 VA. L. REV. 805, 805 (1999).
33. See Edwards & Livermore, supra note 4, at 1907–10.
34. Id. at 1917.
35. Id. at 1943.
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asserts: “Based on my twenty-nine years on the court, my
claim is that decisions are based on legal materials and are
the product of fruitful judicial deliberations.” 36
Other federal circuit judges echo Judge Edwards’
sentiment. Former Judge Deanell Reece Tacha offers that,
on the question of “whether judicial collegiality enhances the
quality of appellate decisionmaking[,] [m]y answer is an
emphatic, ‘Yes.’” 37 As the late Judge Frank Coffin put it,
judicial collegiality affects “the flavor, quality, and—at their
best—the wisdom of appellate opinions.” 38
If judicial collegiality is valuable and enhances the
quality of judicial decision making, then what exactly is it
and whence, and when, does it arise? Professors Cross and
Tiller analogize judicial collegiality to the collegiality often
sought after, and sometimes found, by academics. 39 While
Professors Cross and Tiller have characterized the
“Edwards/Coffin conceptualization” of judicial collegiality as
“a rather ‘warm and fuzzy’ concept of sensitive, collaborative
production aimed at optimizing the result,” 40 it seems that
the judges who have described their experiences with judicial
collegiality agree that at its core it rests on mutual respect
and openness to other’s ideas, arguments, and positions. 41
Chancellor Howard Gillman has suggested that
collegiality arises out of “(a) experiences of duty and
professional obligation, (b) understandings of shared
purpose, (c) concerns about the maintenance of corporate

36. Id. at 1951.
37. Tacha, supra note 7, at 586.
38. FRANK M. COFFIN, THE WAYS OF A JUDGE: REFLECTIONS FROM THE FEDERAL
APPELLATE BENCH 172 (1980). See Levin Campbell, Coffin’s Court: A Colleague’s
View, 63 ME. L. REV. 417, 436 (2011) (“Judge Coffin viewed collegiality as
essential to the quality of the work put out by the federal courts of appeals.”).
39. Cross & Tiller, supra note 12, at 257–58.
40. Id. at 258.
41. See supra text accompanying notes 3–10.
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authority or legitimacy, and (d) participation in a routine.” 42
Professor Adeno Addis and I have elsewhere argued that
judicial deliberation takes place where four criteria are
met: 43 (i) The judges must sincerely have as their goal the
search for the truth or the most defensible result; 44 (ii) the
judges must “advance and defend their proposals and
propositions with reasons that are acknowledged as such by
and are accessible to others”; 45 (iii) the judges must “treat
each other as free and equal with their own commitments
and think that they owe one another accessible and
acceptable justifications for the conclusions and judgments
that they reach”; 46 and (iv) over time, “decisions [should] lead
to further dialogue and revision as participants take into
account the views of others and in the process transform
their own views and preferences.” 47
Two factors bolster the view that the judges’ conception
of collegiality is “rather ‘warm and fuzzy’”—that is, rather
ambiguously defined. First, there is confusion over the valid
observable implications of collegiality—that is, over what
one might expect to observe where judicial collegiality is
present. Consider Judge Edwards’ emphasis on unanimity in
decision making on multimember courts: Judge Edwards’
early work on collegiality focused on unanimity as evidence
of collegiality and, after lamenting existing empirical legal
studies’ failure to consider collegiality, his latest working
42. Howard Gillman, The New Institutionalism, Part I: More and Less than
Strategy: Some Advantages to Interpretive Institutionalism in the Analysis of
Judicial Politics, LAW & CTS., Winter 1996–97, at 6, 8.
43. See Adeno Addis & Jonathan Remy Nash, Identitarian Anxieties and the
Nature of Inter-Tribunal Deliberations, 9 CHI. J. INT’L L. 613, 615 (2009). The
focus of the work Professor Addis and I undertook was specifically inter-tribunal
deliberation, that is, deliberation across courts and judicial systems. See id. at
613. However, the basic analytic points readily translate to deliberation among
judges on a single court.
44. See id. at 615.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 616.
47. Id.
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paper again touts unanimity as establishing the existence of
collegiality.
Yet there is reason to question whether unanimity in
decision making is necessarily evidence of collegiality at
work, or even necessarily will arise where collegiality is
indeed at work. Dean Revesz has noted that the evidence he
found of panel effects
could be consistent with either a “deliberation hypothesis,” under
which judges modify their views because they “take seriously the
views of their colleagues,” or a “dissent hypothesis,” under which “a
judge who sits with two colleagues from the other party moderates
his or her views in order to avoid having to write a dissent.” 48

Moreover, just as colleagues on a faculty might respect
one another and be open to one another’s views and still
reach divergent conclusions on some issues, so too might
collegial judges end up voting differently in numerous cases.
Indeed, Judge Harris has asserted that “collegiality and the
suppression of disagreement are at cross purposes with each
other,” 49 while Sixth Circuit Judge Bernice Donald has
argued that “dissent and collegiality should not be seen as
binary opposites.” 50
A second factor that leads commentators to consider
“judicial collegiality” an amorphous concept is the idea that,
even to the extent there are implications that one might
expect would accompany collegiality, those implications are
notoriously difficult to measure. For example, Professors
Cross and Tiller comment—accurately, it seems—that we
ought to observe truly collegial judges changing their votes
over the course of hearing and deciding cases. 51 But evidence
48. Revesz, supra note 32, at 834 (quoting Revesz, supra note 1, at 1732–33).
49. Levine, supra note 10.
50. Bernice B. Donald, The Intrajudicial Factor in Judicial Independence:
Reflections on Collegiality and Dissent in Multi-Member Courts, 47 U. MEM. L.
REV. 1123, 1129 (2017).
51. See supra text accompanying note 17; see also Wald, supra note 11, at
522–23 (noting a survey of appellate judges finding, and agreeing from personal
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of intra-case vote fluidity is generally available only from
judges’ personal papers, and such papers are simply not
available on any kind of systematic basis. In the end, though
it may be what Professors Cross and Tiller describe as “a
shortcoming of social science research practices,” the fact
remains that social science research tends to “overlook
features less amenable to measure.” 52
In this Article, I use a measure other than directionality
of, or changes in, votes to assess collegiality. I focus instead
on content of opinions in cases where there is in fact
disagreement. Specifically, I look to see whether, in cases
where there is a dissenting opinion, the judges on either side
of the divide respect one another and their opinions. The logic
behind this approach is simple: First, the core conception of
judicial collegiality does not suggest that it is absent when
disagreement triumphs in a particular case. To the contrary,
advocates of the importance of collegiality emphasize that
collegiality requires judges to be open to, and respect, one
another’s arguments, not that it requires judges actually to
be convinced by their fellow judges’ arguments.
Second, to the extent that collegiality rests on and begets
respect among judges, there are readily observable
implications that should arise in opinions where dissent is
present. And, as I discuss in the next Part, this allows me to
generate testable hypotheses.
B. Incentives and Disincentives to Behave Collegially
A judge’s incentives to be collegial can be placed under
two broad categories: (i) a true commitment to, and
preference for, collegiality; and (ii) instrumental concerns. I
explore each of these categories in turn.
First, the incentives of a judge to behave collegially
experience that “when precedents are absent or ambiguous, personalities,
predilections and group relations fill the void”).
52. Cross & Tiller, supra note 12, at 271.

2022]

MEASURING JUDICIAL COLLEGIALITY

1577

might result from a true commitment to, and preference for,
collegiality. A judge might be a collegial person; indeed,
perhaps, by virtue of self-selection and/or the judicial
selection process, judges are generally collegial.
Moreover, given the varied nature of interpersonal
relations, it may be that some judges have an easier time
being—and are more naturally—collegial toward some of
their colleagues than toward others. Commentators have
theorized, and to some degree found, that greater group
homogeneity is likely to lead to collegiality. 53 There is reason
to believe that the same might be true for judges grouped
together on a court: One might think that judges who are
more similar (along relevant metrics) might be more likely to
express collegiality for one another and other judges’
opinions. 54
Furthermore, even a judge who is not generally collegial
might behave collegially on her court, either because she has
developed a collegial attitude toward her fellow judges, or
because she has internalized a norm of collegiality that

53. See, e.g., Keith Ingersoll, Edmund Malesky & Sebastian M. Saiegh,
Heterogeneity and Team Performance: Evaluating the Effect of Cultural Diversity
in the World’s Top Soccer League, 3 J. SPORTS ANALYTICS 67, 69 (2017)
(“[C]ombining members with different backgrounds may hamper the team’s
cooperation and collaboration.”); id. at 70 (“Activities in which a good fit between
various units is the first concern (for example, bike manufacturing where its
different parts have to be assembled), should have a homogeneous workforce in
order to maximize coordination. In contrast, activities where problems are
identified, but team members must find creative ways to solve them (i.e. research
and design projects) should have a more heterogeneous workforce in order to
maximize the chance of developing successful innovations.”); Andrea Prat,
Should a Team Be Homogeneous?, 46 EUR. ECON. REV. 1187, 1200 (2002) (using
modeling to reach the same conclusion).
54. See Murphy, supra note 9, at 456 (noting that differences in ideology,
background, culture, and expertise of judges can work against collegiality);
Nancy Staudt, Barry Friedman & Lee Epstein, On the Role of Ideological
Homogeneity in Generating Consequential Constitutional Decisions, 10 U. PA. J.
CONST. L. 361, 367–71 (2008) (arguing that more homogeneous Supreme Court
majority coalitions tend to render more consequential decisions because such
coalitions will have more comparable preferences).
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pervades the court. 55 Judges and commentators argue that
repeated interactions among judges make this more likely56
(although there is also a school of thought that people are
less polite, or even rude, to people with whom they are closer
and deal repeatedly 57). This logic suggests that collegiality
should be more common on courts with fewer judges 58 and on
courts with judges sitting in fewer courthouses (i.e., with
more judges sitting together in the same courthouses). 59
55. See VIRGINIA A. HETTINGER, STEFANIE A. LINDQUIST & WENDY L.
MARTINEK, JUDGING ON A COLLEGIAL COURT: INFLUENCES ON FEDERAL APPELLATE
DECISION MAKING 39 (2006) (“[A] judge may be disinclined to author separate
opinions, seeing them as potentially detrimental to his good reputation by
marking him as difficult or injudicious.”).
56. See Murphy, supra note 9, at 458 (“Collegiality requires a familiarity with
other judges . . . .”); Tacha, supra note 7, at 588 (“The first and most important
factor is that the judges know each other well personally.”).
57. See, e.g., DENISE SOLOMON & JENNIFER THEISS, INTERPERSONAL
COMMUNICATION: PUTTING THEORY INTO PRACTICE 338 (1st ed. 2013) (noting that,
at least in some ways, “you are less polite or even rude to your close friends,
romantic partner, and family members”). Consider as well the common adage,
“Familiarity breeds contempt.”
58. See JONATHAN MATTHEW COHEN, INSIDE APPELLATE COURTS: THE IMPACT
COURT ORGANIZATION ON JUDICIAL DECISION MAKING IN THE UNITED STATES
COURTS OF APPEALS 161 (2002) (“In a small circuit, . . . the judges deal with each
other regularly, sitting on panels together relatively frequently. That can carry
advantages because the judges become more familiar with one another, leading
to better communication regarding the development of circuit law as well as more
informal communication regarding specific cases.”).
OF

59. Jonathan Cohen describes the relevant overarching criterion as
“geographic size,” which he then explains “can be measured in at least two ways:
(1) the geographic span of the circuit; and (2) the geographic dispersion of the
court’s resources.” Id. at 153. Cohen finds little support in interviews with judges
for the notion that the geographic span of the circuit reduces collegiality. See id.
(Cohen explains that “[t[he only way in which there was any hint that the court’s
geographic span might have an effect is in the diversity of the judges who sit on
the cases.” Id. However, this is not so much a point about how a feature of a court
directly affects collegiality, but rather a point about how judicial heterogeneity
may increase with geographic span to the extent that characteristics of
population may serve as a proxy for characteristics of judges. See infra note 157.)
Instead, Cohen finds that “[m]ore significant to the judges’ interaction with one
another is the court’s geographic dispersion . . . .” COHEN, supra note 58, at 154.
And, while at least one judge Cohen interviewed described the growing
importance of “cybercollegiality”—that is, electronic interactions that substitute
for personal interactions where judges are not in the same building, id. at 157—
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Second, the incentives of a judge to behave collegially
instead—or additionally—might arise from instrumental
concerns. A judge seen as violating a court’s norm of
collegiality might suffer consequences. 60 A judge might be
concerned that, if her colleagues perceive her to have acted
uncollegially, they may in turn act uncollegially toward her.
A judge also might worry about other informal sanctions. For
example, judges responsible for opinion assignment might
assign authorship responsibility for undesirable opinions to
the uncollegial judge. 61
Alternatively, legitimacy and court power might induce
a judge to act collegially. It is well understood that a court
draws its power from its perceived legitimacy, 62 and
collegiality enhances legitimacy. Accordingly, the judge
might act collegially out of self-interest in maintaining (or
extending) the court’s power (and hence her own). Such a
calculation might convince a dissenting judge to act
Cohen nevertheless acknowledges that technological “advances have not enabled
the judges to communicate as informally as judges can do when they work in the
same building,” id. at 156–57.
60. Cf. Lisa Bernstein, Private Commercial Law in the Cotton Industry:
Creating Cooperation Through Rules, Norms, and Institutions, 99 MICH. L. REV.
1724, 1745–54 (2001) (describing the development and importance of reputationbased non-legal sanctions in regulating the cotton industry).
61. See Melinda Gann Hall, Opinion Assignment Procedures and Conference
Practices in State Supreme Courts, 73 JUDICATURE 209, 210 (1989) (“A system of
discretionary opinion assignments . . . creates strategic opportunities for the
assigning justices. The ability to reward members of the court with desirable
opinion assignments or to punish colleagues with a barrage of uninteresting or
unimportant cases can be used to discourage the expression of disagreement with
the assigning justices, leading to greater consensus within the institution and
greater power for those with assignment responsibilities.”); see also Frank B.
Cross & Stefanie Lindquist, The Decisional Significance of the Chief Justice, 154
U. PA. L. REV. 1665, 1673 (2006) (“[T]he Chief’s assignment power may provide
. . . leverage over the other Justices. In theory, the Chief Justice may . . . use her
position to punish or reward Justices for whatever reason she chooses.”).
62. See, e.g., Brandon L. Bartels & Christopher D. Johnston, On the
Ideological Foundations of Supreme Court Legitimacy in the American Public, 57
AM. J. POL. SCI. 184, 184 (2013) (“For an institution like the U.S. Supreme Court
to render rulings that carry authoritative force, it must maintain a sufficient
reservoir of institutional legitimacy . . . .”).
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collegially, especially when the panel has broken along
ideological lines, lest the perception that courts decide cases
ideologically were to grow. 63
Third, a judge might act collegially to satisfy her
perception of what an external “audience” to whom she is
playing would prefer. 64 Thus, for example, the judge might
act collegially if she believes it would enhance her chances of
elevation to a higher court. Specifically, the judge would have
an incentive to act collegially if she believes that the selectors
of judges at higher levels of the judiciary prefer to elevate
collegial judges. 65 Similarly, a judge would have an incentive
to act collegially if she believes that acting collegially would
burnish her reputation. 66
Practically speaking, if the press is likely to cover a case,
the opinions in the case are more likely to reach the key
audience about which a judge is concerned. That being so,
63. There is evidence that public support for the judicial system transcends
ideological and political lines. See JAMES L. GIBSON & GREGORY A. CALDEIRA,
CITIZENS, COURTS, AND CONFIRMATIONS: POSITIVITY THEORY AND THE JUDGMENTS
OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE 61 (2009) (“Liberals trust the Court at roughly the same
level as conservatives; Democrats and Republicans hold the Supreme Court in
similar regard.”). Lack of collegiality between judges of different ideologies might
undermine this cross-cutting support.
64. See Joshua B. Fischman & David S. Law, What Is Judicial Ideology, and
How Should We Measure It?, 29 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 133, 148 (2009) (noting
that a judge may cast vote on the basis of “desire for the esteem of a particular
audience”); Rachael K. Hinkle, Michael J. Nelson & Morgan L. W. Hazelton,
Deferring, Deliberating, or Dodging Review: Explaining Counterjudge Success in
the US Courts of Appeals, 8 J.L. & COURTS 277, 281–82, 290–96 (2020) (noting
that judges who write separate opinions sometimes do so for external audiences,
but finding empirical support for ideological motivations).
65. See Ed R. Haden, Judicial Selection: A Pragmatic Approach, 24 HARV. J.L.
& PUB. POL’Y 531, 545–46 (2001) (explaining the logic behind Presidents trying to
select judges who can effectively build judicial coalitions).
66. See G. Edward White, Toward A Historical Understanding of Supreme
Court Decision-Making, 91 DENV. U.L. REV. ONLINE 201, 209–10 (2014) (“[I]t is
incontrovertible that interaction with colleagues is a major dimension of a
modern Justice’s work, that the effectiveness of a Justice’s collegial contributions
is regularly assessed by that Justice’s colleagues, and that a Justice’s
effectiveness or ineffectiveness as a colleague contributes to his or her
reputation.”).
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judges may have an added incentive to express collegiality in
cases that they anticipate are more likely to be reported on
by the media, and more widely read and cited. 67
Just as there are incentives for judges to behave
collegially, so too are there disincentives. The conception of
collegiality that calls for unanimity in decision—or even that
judges take the time to understand (if not ultimately to come
around to agree with) the other judges’ view—can be costly.
There can be psychic cost to joining an opinion with which
one disagrees, 68 and it takes time and effort to engage other
judges—and possibly then to adjust one’s opinion to take
account of the opposing arguments. 69
It is far less costly, by comparison, simply to behave
civilly. To be sure, some individuals may find it costlier to
behave civilly, and some individuals may find it costlier to
behave civilly toward particular individuals. 70 Expressing
collegiality would seem even less costly than behaving civilly,
67. See Wald, supra note 11, at 524 (“Personal antagonisms do fester and
breed on courts, as elsewhere; the press is only too willing to pick up on and
publicize them . . .”); id. at 525 (Where judges feud, “[e]very split decision is billed
as a further skirmish in the guerrilla warfare between the judges. Reporting on
the substance of decisions gets lost in the byplay.”); cf. id. at 523 (“The press and
public opinion also drive courts toward consensus: the model appellate court is
perceived as one that agrees on everything. And courts themselves seem happiest
when they are united.”).
68. One can think of this psychic cost as the result of foregoing the benefit of
filing a separate dissenting opinion. As Justice Antonin Scalia once said, it is an
“unparalleled pleasure” to write a dissenting opinion since it affords the judge
the opportunity “[t]o be able to write an opinion solely for oneself, without the
need to accommodate; “to any degree whatever, the more-or-less differing views
of one’s colleagues; to address precisely the points of law that one considers
important and no others;” and “to express precisely the degree of quibble, or
foreboding, or disbelief, or indignation that one believes the majority’s disposition
should engender—that is indeed an unparalleled pleasure.” Antonin Scalia, The
Dissenting Opinion, 1994 J. SUP. CT. HIST. 33, 42 (1994).
69. See HETTINGER ET AL., supra note 55, at 20 (“Dissenting opinions usually
mean more work for the judges on the panel, not only for the dissenter herself,
who must expend a scarce resource (time) to craft the separate opinion, but also
for those in the majority who may feel the need to counter the dissenter’s
arguments.”).
70. See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
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although there may be a small cost associated with preparing
“stock” collegial language, 71 communicating that point to law
clerks to the extent that clerks actually draft a judge’s
opinions, 72 or both.
II. DISSENT AS A SETTING IN WHICH TO STUDY COLLEGIALITY
Dissent is a natural setting in which to examine
collegiality. Judge Edwards asserts that unanimity of
decision—that is, the absence of dissent—is reflective of
collegiality. 73 Professors Cross and Tiller’s argument that
the fluidity of judges’ votes would provide an excellent
window into collegiality at work rests on the assumption that
collegiality can convert dissent to unanimity. 74
It stands to reason, then, that the collegiality
nevertheless may persist even where dissent is indeed the
final outcome. To put it another way, if collegiality can
successfully produce decisional unanimity, and indeed can
induce judges to suppress their dissenting beliefs, then
presumably there will be some cases where dissent emerges
in spite of collegiality.
But when will a judge dissent, and in what subset of
cases with a dissent will the dissenting judge do so
collegially? I address each question in turn.
A. The Decision to Dissent
There will only be a dissenting opinion if both (i) the
dissenting judge has preferences that differ from the judges
in the majority, and (ii) the dissenting judge deems it
worthwhile to file a dissenting opinion. I consider each of
71. See infra note 112 and accompanying text (noting that dissenting with
“respect” is commonplace).
72. But see COHEN, supra note 58, at 13 (“A common criticism of the
institution of law clerks is that they hurt collegiality by isolating judges.”).
73. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
74. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
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these steps in turn, focusing on the role of the judges on the
panel, the case, the characteristics of the would-be dissenting
judge, and the characteristics of the court. 75
1. Divergence of Panel Preferences
There will only be a dissenting opinion in a case if and
only if there is a disagreement among the judges on the panel
as to at least part of the proper disposition of the case. If the
lone judge disagrees with the disposition completely, then
she will file a dissenting opinion; if she disagrees in part, she
will file an opinion dissenting in part (possibly captioned as
an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part). 76
Whether a judge will differ with her colleagues on
disposition will generally depend upon the preferences of the
judges and the nature of the case. While individual
preferences are hard to discern, commentators have
theorized, and empirically validated, that a judge’s
ideology 77 is a good predictor of how a judge will vote. 78 In
particular, on courts of appeals, ideological divergence
between two judges on one hand, the third judge on the other,
is a good predictor of whether there will be a dissent in a
case.
Beyond the relative ideology of the judges, commentators
have also found the presence (or absence) of dissent to be a
function of the nature of the case. Some cases raise issues, or
75. See HETTINGER ET AL., supra note 55, at 33–41 (identifying characteristics
of cases, judges, and courts as relevant to whether there will be dissensus).
76. If a judge disagrees with the majority’s reasoning but nevertheless agrees
with the result reached by the majority, then the judge should file an opinion
concurring in the judgment. (Even in that circumstance, some judges will caption
their opinion as one “concurring in part and dissenting in part.”)
77. It is generally impossible to measure a judge’s ideology directly. See, e.g.,
Fischman & Law, supra note 64, at 143–45. Commentators instead often rely
upon the appointing President’s ideology, or a combination of the ideologies of the
appointing President and Senators from the judge’s state of the same party as
the President, as a proxy for the judge’s ideology. See, e.g., id. at 166–76.
78. See, e.g., id. at 147–49 (noting problems with equating votes as a proxy for
preferences).
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arise under areas of law, that are more politically salient,
and hence are more likely to induce judges to vote along the
lines of their ideological differences. 79
2. Rationing Dissent
Just because a judge has a different view as to the proper
disposition of a case does not mean that that judge will
dissent. While difference of opinion is a prerequisite to
dissent, its presence is not sufficient for dissent. 80
The notion that judges will cast votes in accordance with
their own preferences, unconstrained by other concerns, is
embodied in the “attitudinal model” propounded by political
science Professors Segal and Spaeth. 81 Most critiques of the
attitudinal model focus on factors that may sway a judge to
vote against her preferred position even where that vote
would carry the day on the court. These critiques center on
institutional constraints on judging. In particular, critics
argue that a judge may consider whether another actor—a
reviewing court or a legislature—might overturn his or her
preferred outcome and replace it with something less
desirable. 82 While the Supreme Court (as the highest court)
need only concern itself with the response of the legislature
(and then to a large extent only in statutory and common law
cases, as opposed to constitutional ones 83), judges on a
federal court of appeals panel may concern themselves with
responsive action not only by the legislature, but also by the
Supreme Court and by the court of appeals itself sitting en

79. See Sunstein et al., supra note 1, at 309–10 (noting that some areas of law
“by general agreement, are ideologically contested,” while suggesting that other
areas involve cases that are “apparently nonideological”).
80. See Lee Epstein, William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Why (and
When) Judges Dissent: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis, 3 J. LEGAL
ANALYSIS 101, 103–20 (2011) (presenting an economic model of “dissent
aversion”).
81. See supra notes 21–22 and accompanying text.
82. See Donald, supra note 50, at 1130.
83. See EPSTEIN & KNIGHT, supra note 25, at 141–45.
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banc. 84
Much as factors beyond the judge’s pure preferences
affect whether the judge will cast a vote on the winning side
in line with, or against, his or her preferences, so too may
such factors affect whether a lone judge will cast a vote in
line with his or preferences—and file a dissent—or against
his or her preferences—by suppressing a dissent. Table 1
summarizes these factors.
TABLE 1. Factors favoring, and disfavoring, dissent.
Factors Favoring Dissent

Factors Disfavoring Dissent

True commitment to legal
principle and/or outcome

Collegiality

Desire to signal appropriateness
of further review

Cost/effort to judge of dissenting
(workload)

Perceived need to provide
dialogue, and encourage
evolution, in the area of law

Personal reputation
Court legitimacy
Perceived need to make the area
of law more predictable

Several factors conspire to likely constrain a judge’s
freedom to dissent, especially across a run of cases. First,
from an institutional perspective, collegiality may limit
dissent. 85 It has been argued that collegiality can be
measured by unanimity of decision. 86 Even if the
relationship is not purely linear, it still stands to reason that
collegiality is reduced (or not at a high level to begin with)
84. See Virginia A. Hettinger, Stefanie A. Lindquist & Wendy Martinek,
Comparing Attitudinal and Strategic Accounts of Dissenting Behavior on the U.S.
Courts of Appeals, 48 AM. J. POL. SCI. 123, 124–25 (2004).
85. See Epstein et al., supra note 80, at 104; Donald, supra note 50, at 1130.
86. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
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where a judge who might dissent is never won over by her
colleagues’ arguments.
Second, also from an institutional perspective, the desire
to ensconce and maintain judicial legitimacy may reduce
dissent. 87 It is well accepted that unanimous decisions
generally increase a court’s legitimacy, 88 which in turn
makes it easier to enforce a court’s judgments. 89 Thus, a
judge who is otherwise inclined to dissent might hesitate to
do so to the extent that dissent undermines the court’s
legitimacy. 90
Third, dissent may be undesirable from the individual
judge’s instrumental perspective. Judge Richard Posner has
argued that many, if not most, judges value their leisure
time. 91 Drafting a dissent—and then the subsequent backand-forth between the dissenting judge and the judges in the
majority—consumes time and effort. 92 A lone judge
reasonably might question whether it is worth surrendering
time and effort in a lost cause.
Fourth, even if a judge does not care about being collegial
for normative reasons, she might want to burnish her
reputation as a collegial judge—or at least avoid gaining the
reputation of a “serial dissenter.” A judge might be concerned
that, if she is seen to dissent too much, her fellow judges
87. See Donald, supra note 50, at 1130.
88. See HETTINGER ET AL., supra note 55, at 19 (“[U]nanimity among judges
may promote institutional legitimacy and effective implementation of individual
decisions by providing a unified voice behind judicial policies.”).
89. See id. (“Consensual decision making . . . may aid in enhancing
compliance with court decisions.”).
90. See id. (“Dissensus . . . undermines consensual decision-making
processes, and consensual decision making on appellate courts serves critical
institutional interests.”). At the same time, there is a collective action problem in
that the legitimacy benefit flows to all the judges, not just the would-be dissenting
judge. See LAWRENCE BAUM, JUDGES AND THEIR AUDIENCES: A PERSPECTIVE ON
JUDICIAL BEHAVIOR 65 (2006).
91. See Richard A. Posner, What Do Judges and Justices Maximize? (The
Same Thing Everybody Else Does), 3 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 1, 2 (1993).
92. See Epstein et al., supra note 80, at 104.
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might be less likely to sign onto majority opinions that she
drafts. She also might think that those who select higher
level judges might be less likely to elevate a judge who is seen
to dissent too often. 93 Finally, a judge might think that
dissenting too frequently could dilute the signal the dissents
send to reviewing courts. 94
The foregoing suggests that many judges will internalize
some limit on how often they can dissent. Dissenting
effectively uses up a scarce resource, so that judges who (left
to their own devices) would dissent in a large number of cases
must identify the subset of those cases where it is actually
worth filing dissents. 95
It seems that the nature of each individual case will
weigh heavily in that calculus. Consider first that a judge is
more likely to dissent in a case where the judge has a true

93. See Haden, supra note 65, at 545–46 (discussing the likelihood that those
who select judges might prefer candidates who might excel at assembling
coalitions).
On the other hand, some judges might affirmatively seek the reputation
of serial dissenter. (Some so describe Justice John Paul Stevens. See, e.g., Jeffrey
Rosen, The Dissenter, Justice John Paul Stevens, N.Y. TIMES MAG., (Sept. 23,
2007), https://www.nytimes.com/2007/09/23/magazine/23stevens-t.html.) For
example, Justice Antonin Scalia spoke about his desire to establish his
reputation—perhaps especially through dissents—for law students, perhaps
indicating less of a concern for his reputation among his colleagues or the public
today. See Molly Cooke, Justice Scalia Addresses First-Year Law Students, THE
HOYA (Nov. 17, 2005), https://thehoya.com/justice-scalia-addresses-first-yearlaw-students (noting the Justice’s observation that he “geared his dissents
toward study in law classes because of his hope for the next generation of lawyers
“); see also Margaret Talbot, Supreme Confidence: The Jurisprudence of Justice
Antonin
Scalia,
NEW
YORKER
(Mar.
28,
2005),
https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2005/03/28/
supreme-confidence. (“[H]is opinions seem to be for the benefit of a future
generation that may yet be saved for originalism.”).
94. See Deborah Beim, Alexander V. Hirsch & Jonathan P. Kastellec,
Whistleblowing and Compliance in the Judicial Hierarchy, 58 AM. J. POL. SCI.
904, 905 (2014).
95. See Anthony Niblett & Albert H. Yoon, Judicial Disharmony: A Study of
Dissent, 42 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 60, 70 (2015) (providing empirical evidence that
majority and dissenting opinions generally rely on distinct precedents, not
different readings of the same precedent).
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commitment to the legal principle or outcome in the case. 96
To the extent that (as discussed above) the difference in
opinion in the case is an outgrowth of ideological distance, it
seems likely that dissent will be more likely in more
politically salient cases. 97
Second, a judge is more likely to dissent if she believes it
important to increase the likelihood of review by a higher
judicial actor. 98 Studies have shown that the presence of a
dissent increases the likelihood of discretionary appellate
review. 99 That being the case, it is understood that filing a
dissent is a way to “signal” a higher court that review is
appropriate. 100 In the case of a court of appeals panel
96. See, e.g., HETTINGER ET AL., supra note 55, at 34 (“Based on their
substantive content, some cases simply lack the content necessary to elicit
dissensus in the form of dissents or reversals.”); cf. Lewis A. Kornhauser &
Lawrence G. Sager, The One and the Many: Adjudication in Collegial Courts, 81
CAL. L. REV. 1, 58 (1993) (suggesting that, in cases of doctrinal paradox—that is,
cases in which “rationales and outcomes are set in conflict with each other”—
judges on multimember courts can and should “decide whether the court, in the
aggregate, is more durably committed to its judgment as to the pertinent
rationales or its judgment as to the outcome”).
97. See, e.g., HETTINGER ET AL., supra note 55, at 39 (“[S]alient, complex, and
ambiguous cases all are more likely to foster the expression of dissensus among
judges.”); cf. id. at 34 (noting that “the nature of the U.S. Courts of Appeals’
mandatory docket means that a significant proportion of the cases handled by
circuit judges do not raise issues that are matters of first impression or otherwise
legally consequential” and that, “as a general rule, these cases do not raise
questions sufficiently salient to elicit much reaction from the judges deciding
them.”).
The same result might obtain where the would-be dissenting judge is not
herself so concerned with the legal principle or outcome in the case, but wishes
to appeal to an interest group (including those who select which judges to elevate)
that is concerned with the legal principle or outcome.
98. See, e.g., Donald, supra note 50, at 1130.
99. See, e.g., Gregory A. Caldeira, John R. Wright & Christopher J.W. Zorn,
Sophisticated Voting and Gate-Keeping in the Supreme Court, 15 J.L. ECON. &
ORG. 549, 563 (1999) (finding empirical evidence that dissenting panel opinions
increase the likelihood of Supreme Court review); cf. Rachael K. Hinkle &
Michael J. Nelson, How to Lose Cases and Influence People, 8 STAT., POL., & POL’Y
195, 208–13 (2017) (finding that language from dissenting Supreme Court
opinions that is memorable is more likely to be cited in the future).
100. See Tracey E. George, The Dynamics and Determinants of the Decision to
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decision, a dissent might signal that a case is a good
candidate for the court of appeals en banc, and/or the
Supreme Court, to review. 101 Such a case will often be a case
as to which the would-be dissenting judge cares deeply about
the legal principle or outcome. However, it may also be that
the judge is not concerned about the case coming out one way
or the other, but believes that the public, or legal community,
would benefit from a higher court providing clarity on a
governing legal issue. 102
Third, even if higher court review is unlikely or
unpredictable, a lone judge might be more likely to consider
a dissent worthwhile to the extent that the legal issue or area
Grant En Banc Review, 74 WASH. L. REV. 213, 247 (1999) (“[T]he mere fact of a
dissent signals to a nonpanelist that she may justifiably expend personal
resources to rehear the case or at least investigate it further.”); HETTINGER ET AL.,
supra note 55, at 41 (“[C]ircuit judges may choose to dissent to signal the circuit
en banc that the majority panel opinion is contrary to circuit law or contrary to
the preferences of the circuit majority.”); id. (“[C]ourt of appeals judges may use
dissent as a strategic tool to signal the Supreme Court and thereby invite review
by that body.”); see generally Charles M. Cameron, Jeffrey A. Segal & Donald
Songer, Strategic Auditing in a Political Hierarchy: An Informational Model of
the Supreme Court’s Certiorari Decisions, 94 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 101, 103–07
(2000) (presenting a signaling model of Supreme Court certiorari review).
101. See Micheal W. Giles, Thomas G. Walker & Christopher Zorn, Setting a
Judicial Agenda: The Decision to Grant En Banc Review in the U.S. Courts of
Appeals, 68 J. POL. 852, 861 (2006) (finding empirical evidence that dissenting
panel opinions increase the likelihood of en banc review); Caldeira et al., supra
note 99, at 563; George, supra note 100, at 259–60 (describing empirical finding
that, “when a panel member dissents, the panel’s ruling is much more likely to
be reheard en banc than when the panel is unanimous”); Scalia, supra note 68,
at 36–37 (“When a judge of one of our Circuit Courts of Appeals dissents from an
opinion of his colleagues, he warns the Courts of Appeals of the other twelve
Circuits . . . that they should not too readily adopt the same legal rule. And if they
do not . . . a ‘conflict’ among the Circuits will result, ultimately requiring
resolution by the Supreme Court’s grant of a petition for certiorari. At the Court
of Appeals level, a dissent is also a warning flag to the Supreme Court: the losing
party who seeks review can point to the dissent as evidence that the legal issue
is a difficult one worthy of the Court’s attention.”).
102. See, e.g., Allapattah Servs., Inc. v. Exxon Corp., 362 F.3d 739, 745–69
(11th Cir. 2004) (Tjoflat, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc) (portion
of opinion including the caption “The Supreme Court Should Grant Certiorari in
This Case”), aff’d sub nom. Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 545 U.S.
546 (2005); Scalia, supra note 68, at 38 (noting that certain dissents can
“embolden[] counsel in later cases to try again, and to urge an overruling”).
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of law in the case is one that deserves greater dialogue
among judges and courts, 103 or is an issue or area of law that
would benefit from legal evolution. 104 A dissent also might
signal lawyers that the issues in the case are ripe for further
adjudication. 105 On the other hand, the lone judge may
choose not to dissent to the extent that she believes that the
legal question is one that would benefit from the greater
predictability that a unanimous decision would provide. 106
B. Expressions of Collegiality in Dissent
Assuming that (i) there is a genuine difference in opinion
on a panel, and (ii) the judge in the minority has decided to
file a dissent, then the question arises (iii) whether the lone
judge will express collegiality toward the majority in his

103. See Jonathan Remy Nash, The Uneasy Case for Transjurisdictional
Adjudication, 94 VA. L. REV. 1869, 1917 (2008) (“A multiplicity of opinions, and
potentially also of approaches, might help to open debate as to the proper way to
resolve an issue.”); HETTINGER ET AL., supra note 55, at 19 (“[D]issents . . . create
an adversarial crucible from which the most solidly forged rule of law is most
likely to emerge.”); Scalia, supra note 68, at 41 (“The most important internal
effect of a system permitting dissents and concurrences is to improve the majority
opinion.”); see also Addis & Nash, supra note 43, at 616 (noting the importance of
dialogue to judicial deliberation).
104. See HETTINGER ET AL., supra note 55, at 19 (“[D]issents play an important
role in doctrinal evolution.”); Donald, supra note 50, at 1130. As Professor Robert
Schapiro explains in the context of interpreting state constitutional provisions, a
“federal court interpretation may be helpful . . . in contributing to the discussion
of the best way to realize the underlying constitutional value. Federal judges can
contribute to a plurality of legal meaning, which provides a rich background for
the investigation of fundamental rights.” Robert A. Schapiro, Interjurisdictional
Enforcement of Rights in a Post-Erie World, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1399, 1417
(2005); see id. at 1417–20.
105. HETTINGER ET AL., supra note 55, at 20 (“[L]awyers are sensitive to
uncertainty on the court (manifested in dissents or concurrences) and thus may
press litigation in those areas of uncertainty”). The flip side is that dissenting too
often might invite too much future litigation and overburden the court’s docket.
See id.
106. See id. (“When judges march in lockstep, citizens and their lawyers are
better able to predict the outcome of legal disputes that may reach the courts and
thus are more likely to settle their disputes that may reach the courts and thus
are more likely to settle their disputes without recourse to litigation.”).
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dissenting opinion. With the exception of preparing stock
language and conveying the notion to law clerks, the drafting
effort required to express at least basic collegiality is
comparatively inexpensive. 107 Thus, all else equal, one would
expect a dissenting judge to express collegiality at least at a
basic level to the extent that collegiality—whether motivated
by a true feeling or by instrumental concerns—was a factor
in the judge’s decision making calculus as to whether to
dissent in the first place. Indeed, even if a judge did not
herself have collegial feelings and put little weight on
internal court consumption of collegial behavior in deciding
whether to file a dissent in the first place, one might think
that the cost of expressing collegiality was low enough that a
judge who thought there could be some benefit from the
external consumption—i.e., public consumption—of such
expressions that she would include some collegial language
in her dissenting opinion.
One might object to the foregoing analysis on the ground
that the expression of collegiality is so inexpensive that
expressing collegiality will be the default. 108 To whatever
extent that is the case, however, there remains a costly
option: to remove expressions of collegiality that otherwise
would appear by rote. If that is the case, then the measures
here really examine the absence, not the presence, of
expressions of collegiality. Even so, the same prediction
should in the end obtain: One should expect to find
expressions of collegiality as commonplace.
III. MEASURING EXPRESSIONS OF COLLEGIALITY IN DISSENT
The previous Part established dissent as a valuable
setting in which to study collegiality. To do so, it is necessary
to develop measures of collegiality in dissent. It is to that
task that I turn in this Part. Based on existing literature on

107. See supra notes 71–72 and accompanying text.
108. See infra note 112 and accompanying text.
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judicial collegiality, I develop various measures of the
expression of collegiality in dissent.
I have opted to develop measures of dissent based upon
particular choice of language by the dissent author. I
recognize that this goes against the current trend in textbased empirical legal research to rely upon mechanized
textual analytics that identify key words and can detect the
valence of particular language and passages. 109 I have made
the decision to focus on particular choice of language
because, by making such clear choices, the author of a
dissent knows that she can clearly signal her particular
displeasure with the majority’s decision and/or opinion. By
contrast, more diffuse linguistic word choices and valence are
far less clear to readers, and indeed may even be the product
of subconscious preferences and inclinations.
Turning now to particular linguistic choices,
commentators have identified several settings where a
dissenter’s choice of language reflects an expression of
collegiality (or lack thereof) toward the majority. Without
doubt, the most common of these is the dissenting judge’s
decision to state that his or her dissent is taken “with
respect” or “respectfully.” Commentators have described how
the “respectful” dissent grew with the rise of dissents
themselves, 110 to the point that today not noting that a
dissent is “respectful” is virtually tantamount to questioning
the legitimacy of the majority’s reasoning and/or outcome. 111
Because expressions of “respect” have become so
commonplace, 112 it is important to have in place other
109. See, e.g., Michael A. Livermore, Vladimir Eidelman & Brian Grom,
Computationally Assisted Regulatory Participation, 93 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 977,
996–97 (2018).
110. See Note, From Consensus to Collegiality: The Origins of the “Respectful”
Dissent, 124 HARV. L. REV. 1305, 1306 (2011).
111. See id. at 1325–26; Frank B. Cross & James W. Pennebaker, The
Language of the Roberts Court, 2014 MICH. ST. L. REV. 853, 877 (2014).
112. See From Consensus to Collegiality: The Origins of the “Respectful”
Dissent,” supra note 110, at 1325; Donald, supra note 50, at 1145.
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measures for expressions of collegiality. Next, commentators
have described as collegial the decision by a dissenting judge
to refer to the judges in the majority as “the court.” 113 In
contrast, the decision to refer to the judges in the majority as
“the majority” (or variants like ‘the panel majority’) bespeaks
an absence of collegiality. 114 Finally, commentators have
identified as collegial the decision by a dissenting judge to
refer to the judges in the majority as his or her ‘colleagues’
or ‘friends.’ 115
I relied upon the foregoing to implement an empirical
metric of the expression of collegiality in dissent on the
federal courts of appeals, at both the case-level (“case-level
dataset”) and court-level (“court-level dataset”). (In Part IV
below, I return to these databases to perform empirical tests
of various hypotheses.)
A. Case-Level Database
For the case-level dataset, I gathered all cases decided
during the 2016 calendar year by the twelve regional courts
of appeals 116 in which there was a dissenting opinion. 117 I
113. See Ronald J. Placone, The United States Supreme Court and Abortion: A
Decline in Civility, 33 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 181, 195 (2011).
114. See id. at 201.
115. See id.
116. I collected no data for the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit.
117. I searched in Westlaw’s collection of federal court of appeals decisions
using the search: ‘advanced: DA(aft 12-31-2015 & bef 01-01-2017) & SY(dissented
dissenting)’.
I considered but rejected the idea of collecting similar data for concurring
opinions. Some concurring opinions are close to dissents, agreeing with the
majority opinion only on the final outcome; such opinions might generate similar
incentives as dissents with respect to expressions of collegiality. Others, however,
might almost entirely agree with the majority opinion, thus suggesting little in
the way of antagonism. It is unclear whether the author of such a concurring
opinion would (i) readily express collegiality, or (ii) not see the need to express
collegiality given the substantial alignment of views. For this reason, a prediction
about expressions of collegiality in concurrences is far more difficult to craft, and
in any event very different from what one reasonably should expect to find in
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discarded all cases decided en banc. I also discarded all cases
in which a three-judge panel generated three opinions,
except that I retained such cases where there was a clearly
denoted majority opinion, and the judge who issued a
separate concurring opinion made clear that he or she was
joining the majority opinion in full. This generated a dataset
of 527 cases. Table 2 presents a summary of the distribution
of the cases across the federal circuits.

dissents.
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TABLE 2. Frequency and Percentage of cases in case-level
dataset, by circuit.

Circuit

D.C.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
TOTAL

Number
of Cases

Number of
Cases,
Excluding
Per Curiam
Cases

Number of
Published
Cases

23
(4.36%)
12
(2.28%)
15
(3.01%)
25
(4.74%)
30
(5.69%)
49
(9.77%)
91
(17.3%)
33
(6.26%)
52
(9.87%)
142
(26.94%)
31
(5.88%)
24
(4.55%)
527

20
(4.80%)
12
(2.88%)
14
(3.36%)
25
(6.00%)
27
(6.47%)
37
(8.87%)
85
(20.38%)
31
(7.343%)
45
(10.79%)
73
(17.50%)
30
(7.19%)
18
(4.32%)
417

22
(5.91%)
12
(3.23%)
15
(4.03%)
18
(4.84%)
22
(5.91%)
36
(9.68%)
43
(11.56%)
33
(8.87%)
50
(14.13%)
73
(19.62%)
27
(7.26%)
21
(5.65%)
372

Number of
Published
Cases,
Excluding
Per Curiam
Cases
20
(5.68%)
12
(3.41%)
14
(3.98%)
18
(5.11%)
22
(6.25%)
33
(9.38%)
41
(11.65%)
31
(8.81%)
45
(12.78%)
73
(20.74%)
27
(7.67%)
16
(4.55%)
352

For each case in the dataset, I coded basic citation
information; the circuit court that decided the case; whether
the case was published; whether the majority opinion was
signed or issued per curiam; the political party of the
President who appointed each of the three panel members;
and whether the dissenting judge dissented in full or
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partially. 118 I also coded whether the majority-dissent split
was ideological—that is, whether the judges constituting the
majority were appointed by Presidents of the same political
party and the dissenting judge was appointed by a President
of the other political party.
In an effort to discern whether the majority and
dissenting judges treated each other collegially, I also coded
whether the majority opinion used the word “respect” in
referring to the dissenting opinion or judge; whether the
dissenting opinion used the word “respect” in referring to the
majority opinion or judges; whether the majority opinion
used the words “colleague,” “panelist,” or “friend” in referring
to the dissenting judge; whether the dissenting opinion used
the words “colleagues,” “panelists,” or “friends” in referring
to the majority judges; and whether the dissenting opinion
referred to the majority coalition as “the court” or “the panel”
(as opposed to the much more common appellation “the
majority”). 119
Commentators have observed that expressions of
“respect” in dissent have become almost ubiquitous across
the run of cases, while at the same time some judges deploy
the term with less frequency or not at all. 120 Accordingly, it
was important to develop measures of collegiality that
captured a judge’s (and then a court’s) tendency to express
collegiality in different ways. I generated a variable (“Any
Collegiality”) for each case that indicated whether the
dissenting opinion used any kind of collegial language with
respect to the majority opinion (i.e., whether the dissenting
118. In coding, I abided by the heading that the authoring judge chose to
describe his or her separate opinion. For example, one judge captioned a separate
opinion as “concurring in the judgment but otherwise dissenting.” Technically,
this would be referred to as a simple concurring opinion, but I included it in the
dataset as a partial dissent.
119. I only coded a case as having a dissent that used the term “the court” when
the dissenting opinion used that term to refer to the majority opinion (not, for
example, to the Supreme Court majority in some other case).
120. See From Consensus to Collegiality: The Origins of the “Respectful”
Dissent,” supra note 110, at 1324.
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opinion either (i) used the word “respect” in referring to the
majority opinion or judges, or (ii) used the words
“colleagues,” “panelists,” or “friends” in referring to the
majority judges, or (iii) referred to the majority coalition as
“the court” or “the panel”). I also generated a variable for
each case equal to the sum of all ways the dissenting opinion
used collegial language with respect to the majority opinion
(with a maximum value of 3, since I coded 3 possible ways a
dissenting opinion might manifest such collegiality)
(“Collegiality Sum”).
The two measures—Any Collegiality and Collegiality
Sum—measure collegiality as expressed in dissents in
different ways. By measuring whether the dissenting judge
makes any expression of collegiality toward the majority,
Any Collegiality considers whether the dissenting judge
manifests at least some minimal collegial expression toward
the majority. In contrast, Collegiality Sum recognizes that
some base level of collegial expression may be de rigueur, and
looks instead to whether the dissenting judge has gone
beyond that base level to express collegiality in multiple
ways—perhaps a true or more refined measure of
collegiality.
Table 3 presents descriptive data on how often
dissenting opinions employ each of the different ways of
expressing collegiality toward the majority opinion and
judges. (Bear in mind that some opinions express collegiality
in more than one way.) The data make clear that the most
common way by far to express collegiality is to note that the
dissent is taken “respectfully.” They also show that
expressions of collegiality are more common in dissents from
published opinions and dissents from signed majority
opinions.
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TABLE 3. Frequency of various means of expressing
collegiality in court of appeals dissenting opinions (row
percentages in parentheses).

All Cases
Published
Cases
Unpublished
Cases
Cases with
Signed
Majority
Opinions
Cases with
Per Curiam
Majority
Opinions

Number of
Dissenting
Opinions
Expressing
“Respectful”
Dissent

Number of
Dissenting
Opinions
Referring
to the
Majority as
the “Court”
or “Panel”

373
(70.78)
273
(73.39)
100
(64.52)

65
(12.33)
59
(15.86)
6
(3.87)

Number of
Dissenting
Opinions
Referring to
the Majority
Judges as
“Colleagues,”
“Friends,” or
“CoPanelists”
85
(16.13)
72
(19.35)
13
(8.39)

309
(74.10)

58
(13.91)

74
(17.75)

417
(100.00)

64
(58.18)

7
(6.36)

11
(10.00)

110
(100.00)

Total

527
(100.00)
372
(100.00)
116
(100.00)

Analysis of the decision to express collegiality based on
case characteristics would not have much meaning if that
decision were made by judges across cases (i.e., without
regard to case characteristics). Figure 1 presents a histogram
of the fraction of the time that dissenting judges not sitting
by designation express at least one form of collegiality
toward the majority. 121 The distribution does appear
121. I omitted judges sitting by designation for two reasons. First, as discussed
below, a judge sitting by designation will express collegiality toward the majority
as a formality, and thus at higher rates than home-court judges. See infra tbl. 8.
Second, judges sitting by designation are district judges who hear few cases and
thus file even fewer dissents. As such, the vast majority of the judges sitting by
designation in the dataset (22 out of 23 judges) filed a dissent in a single case,
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somewhat bimodal. Figure 1, however, includes fifty-two
judges who filed only one dissent; these judges had no
opportunity within the dataset limitations to exhibit
heterogeneity in the decision to express collegiality. 122
Accordingly, Figure 2 presents a histogram including only
the 112 judges not sitting by designation who filed at least
two dissents. The fact that Figure 2 is far less bimodal
supports the validity of the analysis below.
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FIGURE 1.
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and thus had no opportunity to exhibit heterogeneity in the decision to express
collegiality.
122. See id.
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B. Court-Level Database
I used the data from the case-level dataset to generate
overall circuit measures of collegiality. 123 The question arose
as to what universe of cases was the correct one to use in
constructing these circuit measures. For example, while
some circuits published almost all, or all, cases with a dissent
(for example, the First), others—such as the Ninth—had
numerous unpublished opinions with dissents. The Ninth
Circuit also made much greater use of judges sitting by
designation than did the other circuits.
Rather than choose one “correct” set of cases over which
to examine the court-level hypotheses, I instead developed
different circuit-level measures for each of the various caselevel measures of collegiality. I determined each of these
circuit-level measures using both the entire dataset and
subsets of the dataset: (a) all cases; (b) all published cases;
(c) all cases excluding cases where the dissenting judge was
sitting by designation; and (d) all published cases excluding
cases where the dissenting judge was sitting by designation.
This allowed me to compare circuit collegiality measures
across different sets of cases.
Specifically, for each of the basic case-level measures of
collegiality, I divided the total number of cases from each
circuit that exhibited that measure of collegiality by the total
number of cases in the relevant set from that circuit. Thus,
for example, the measure of “Any Collegiality” in a circuit is
the fraction of cases (ranging from 0 to 1) from that circuit
where either opinion exhibited any form of collegiality
toward the other opinion.
For the various “Total Collegiality” measures, I coded a
123. Before I began assembling circuit-level data on collegiality, I verified that
the case-level dataset generated meaningful data at the circuit level by making
sure that no single judge dominated the data for any circuit. For the First Circuit,
one judge was responsible for a hefty 41.67% of dissents. Across other circuits,
however, no single judge was responsible for writing more than 27.27% of the
dissents.
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case: (i) 0 if the case exhibited no collegiality; (ii) 1 if the case
exhibited one form of relevant collegiality; (iii) 2 if the case
exhibited two forms of collegiality; and (iii) 3 if the case
exhibited all three forms of collegiality. For each circuit, I
then summed the total number of these values and divided
that sum by the total number of cases from each circuit.
(Examples of some of these calculations appear in Tables A1
and A2 in the Appendix.)
Table 4 presents the various collegiality measures (and
ranks) for each circuit, for, respectively, (a) all cases; (b) all
cases excluding cases where the dissenting judge was sitting
by designation; (c) all published cases; and (d) all published
cases excluding cases where the dissenting judge was sitting
by designation. The data reveal variation across the circuits.
The First and Third Circuits perform robustly well across
measures. Though the lower rankings vary more from
measure to measure, the Ninth and Eleventh Circuits overall
seem to perform most poorly.
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TABLE 4. Collegiality
parentheses) (all cases).

All Cases
(N = 527)

Circuit
Collegiality
D.C.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
TOTAL

measures

All Cases
Except
Cases where
the
Dissenting
Judge is
Sitting by
Designation
(N = 504)

(with

All
Published
Cases
(N = 372)

1603

rankings

in

All
Published
Cases Except
Cases where
the
Dissenting
Judge is
Sitting by
Designation
(N = 358)

Any

Total

Any

Total

Any

Total

Any

Total

0.739

1.348

0.739

1.348

0.773

1.409

0.773

1.409

(9)

(3)

(9)

(3)

(9)

(3)

(8)

(3)

1.000

1.583

1.000

1.583

1.000

1.583

1.000

1.583

(1)

(1)

(1)

(1)

(1)

(1)

(1)

(1)

0.800

0.800

0.786

0.786

0.800

0.800

0.786

0.786

(5)

(11)

(5)

(11)

(6)

(11)

(6)

(11)

1.000

1.520

1.000

1.520

1.000

1.500

1.000

1.500

(1)

(2)

(1)

(2)

(1)

(2)

(1)

(2)

0.800

1.100

0.786

1.071

0.818

1.045

0.810

1.048

(5)

(5)

(5)

(6)

(5)

(7)

(5)

(7)

0.898

0.980

0.896

0.979

0.889

1.000

0.886

1.000

(3)

(8)

(3)

(8)

(3)

(9)

(4)

(9)

0.736

0.857

0.724

0.851

0.791

1.024

0.786

1.024

(9)

(9)

(10)

(9)

(7)

(8)

(6)

(8)

0.758

1.212

0.750

1.219

0.758

1.212

0.750

1.219

(7)

(4)

(7)

(4)

(11)

(4)

(11)

(4)

0.750

1.058

0.750

1.058

0.760

1.080

0.760

1.080

(8)

(7)

(7)

(7)

(10)

(6)

(9)

(6)

0.683

0.824

0.664

0.817

0.781

0.986

0.758

0.985

(12)

(10)

(12)

(10)

(8)

(10)

(10)

(10)

0.871

1.097

0.871

1.097

0.889

1.111

0.889

1.111

(4)

(6)

(4)

(5)

(3)

(5)

(3)

(5)

0.708

0.750

0.714

0.762

0.714

0.762

0.684

0.737

(11)

(12)

(11)

(12)

(12)

(12)

(12)

(12)

0.770

0.989

0.764

0.994

0.812

1.086

0.805

1.089

Other circuits perform better on one measure than the
other. The D.C. and Seventh Circuits fare not so well along
the measure of “Any Collegiality,” but fare better on the
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measure of “Total Collegiality.” Evidently, some dissents
offer no respect to the majority, but other dissents make up
for that by evidencing respect in multiple ways. This may
reflect heterogeneity among circuit judges. In contrast, the
Second and Fifth Circuits do better on the “Any Collegiality”
measure than on the “Total Collegiality” measure. This
suggests that the judges on those courts in dissent tend as a
rule to offer one expression of respect—probably noting that
the dissent was “respectful,” and perhaps more as a
formality—but do not go beyond that.
Beyond these collegiality measures, I coded each of the
twelve courts of appeals under study for: (i) the number of
active circuit judges during the 2016 calendar year; 124 (ii) the
number of courthouses housing active circuit judges during
the 2016 calendar year; (iii) the court’s caseload per
authorized judgeship; 125 (iv) the court’s dissent rate,
calculated as the number of cases the court terminated on
the merits in 2016 126 divided by the number of dissents in
the case-level dataset from that court; (v) the extent to which
the court is ideologically heterogeneous, calculated as the
absolute value of ½ less the fraction of active circuit judges
appointed by Republican Presidents; (vi) the total geographic
area encompassed by the circuit; 127 and (vii) the fraction of
124. I counted a circuit judge as “active” if he or she was an active judge for
more than half of 2016.
125. For caseload data, I used the cases pending as of Dec. 31, 2016 as reported
by the Federal Judicial Center, See Table B-1. U.S. Courts of Appeals—Cases
Commenced, Terminated, and Pending, by Circuit and Nature of Proceeding
During the 12-Month Period Ending December 31, 2016, U.S. COURTS,
http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/data_tables/stfj_b1_1231.2016.pdf
(last visited July 11, 2022).
126. I used Federal Judicial Center data on the number of cases terminated on
the merits (following oral argument or submission on the briefs) in 2016. See
Table B-5. U.S. Courts of Appeals—Decisions in Cases Terminated on the Merits,
by Circuit and Nature of Proceeding, During the 12-Month Period Ending
December 31, 2016, U.S. Courts, http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default
/files/data_tables/stfj_b5_1231.2016.pdf (last visited July 11, 2022).
127. I relied on census data and, for those circuits that include U.S. territories,
included those territories in the data. See State Area Measurements and Internal
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population within the circuit categorized by the census as
rural. 128
C. Validating the Measure
There are no other existing measures of expressions of
collegiality. That said, it is possible to validate my measure
against a measure of a related phenomenon. Professors Lee
Epstein, William Landes, and Judge Richard Posner have
analyzed “dissent aversion”—the tendency of judges sitting
in panels not to file dissenting opinions (even if they disagree
with the position reached by the majority). 129 Dissent
aversion turns at least in part on notions of collegiality, 130
and thus it makes sense to expect a measure of dissent
aversion to produce results at least somewhat similar to a
measure of collegiality.
Measuring dissent aversion in terms of a court’s dissent
rate, Epstein, Landes, and Posner hypothesize that dissent
aversion should correlate inversely with the number of
judges on a court, with a court’s workload, and with
ideological distances among a court’s judges. 131 They
operationalize those variables and find support for those
hypotheses on the federal courts of appeals. 132
As reflected in Table 5, I find—much as Epstein, Landes,
and Posner found with respect to dissent rate—that
Point Coordinates, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/geographies/
reference-files/2010/geo/state-area.html (last updated Dec. 16, 2021).
128. I relied on census data and, for those circuits that include U.S. territories,
included the population in those territories in the data. See 2010 Census Urban
and Rural Classification and Urban Area Criteria, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,
https://www.census.gov/programs-surveys/geography/guidance/geo-areas/urbanrural/2010-urban-rural.html (last updated Oct. 8, 2021). Because I relied on
census data, the population numbers count all residents within the circuit
boundaries.
129. See Epstein et al., supra note 80, at 103–34.
130. See id. at 104.
131. See id. at 106–09, 129.
132. See id. at 129–30.
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expressions of collegiality in dissent correlate inversely with
court size. The inverse correlation with court workload is
weaker but still evident. Notably, as Table 5 also reflects, I
find little evidence that the expression of collegiality
correlates with a court’s dissent rate or with a court’s
ideological homogeneity (i.e., my measures of the expression
of collegiality in dissent does not correlate with Epstein,
Landes, and Posner’s measure of dissent aversion). These
findings provide validation for the measures of collegiality I
propound. 133

133. See Robert Adcock & David Collier, Measurement Validity: A Shared
Standard for Qualitative and Quantitative Research, 95 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 529,
540 (2001) (elucidating the concept of “convergent/discriminant validation” by
use of the following questions: “Are the scores . . . produced by alternative
indicators . . . of a given systematized concept . . . empirically associated and thus
convergent? Furthermore, do these indicators have a weaker association with
indicators of a second, different systematized concept, thus discriminating this
second group of indicators from the first?”).
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TABLE 5. Correlations of the measures of collegiality with
number of judgeships, caseload, and dissent rate.
Authorized
Judgeships

Caseload
per
Judgeship

Dissent
Rate

Court
Ideological
Homogeneity

All Cases
Any
Expression
-0.408
-0.241
-0.313
-0.420
of
Collegiality
Total
Expressions
-0.520
-0.487
0.206
-0.121
of
Collegiality
All Cases Except Those with Dissents Authored by Judges Sitting by
Designation
Any
Expression
-0.442
-0.254
-0.301
-0.383
of
Collegiality
Total
Expressions
-0.528
-0.481
0.212
-0.102
of
Collegiality
Published Cases
Any
Expression
-0.217
-0.137
-0.204
-0.468
of
Collegiality
Total
Expressions
-0.401
-0.411
0.369
-0.081
of
Collegiality
Published Cases Except Those with Dissents Authored by Judges Sitting by
Designation
Any
Expression
-0.254
-0.205
-0.150
-0.458
of
Collegiality
Total
Expressions
-0.391
-0.417
0.375
-0.086
of
Collegiality
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IV. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
In this Part, I lay out hypotheses relating to the
expression of collegiality by judges and courts. I then
undertake to evaluate those hypotheses empirically.
A. Hypotheses
In this Section, I develop testable hypotheses based upon
the discussion set out in the previous Section. The initial five
hypotheses address decision making at the case-level by the
courts of appeals. The sixth hypothesis speaks to the relative
frequency with which the courts of appeals (as a whole), as
compared to the Supreme Court, feature expressions of
collegiality in the context of dissent. The final eight
hypotheses test the comparative frequency of expressions of
collegiality in dissent at the court level across the courts of
appeals.
1. Case-Level Hypotheses
In developing case-level hypotheses regarding the
expression of collegiality in dissent, the discussion above
suggests consideration of both features of cases, and features
of the panels hearing the cases. I consider each in turn.
Let us begin with features of cases, and consider first the
distinction between published and unpublished cases. There
are three reasons to expect expressions of collegiality in
dissenting opinions to be less common in cases decided by
unpublished, as opposed to published, opinions. First,
published cases tend to be decided by opinions written in
chambers (either by the judges themselves or their own law
clerks), while unpublished opinions are often (though not
always) drafted by staff law clerks; the lesser proximity
between the judge and the opinion drafting process may
reduce the likelihood of expressions of collegiality. 134 Second,
resorting to deciding cases by unpublished opinion is often a
134. See COHEN, supra note 58, at 13.
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response to time constraints: Unpublished opinions provide
a way for courts to resolve cases quickly. 135 And pressures of
time may correlate with a reduction in the frequency of
expressions of collegiality. 136 Third, unpublished cases are
less likely to be read, and circuit rules place restrictions on
their precedential value. 137 As such, judges are less likely to
deploy expressions of collegiality in dissent in unpublished
cases since those cases are less likely to draw the attention
of the media and key audiences. 138 This reasoning justifies
Hypothesis Case-1 (Publication Hypothesis).
• Hypothesis
Case-1
(Publication
Hypothesis):
Expressions of collegiality in dissent are more likely to
be found in opinions in published cases than
unpublished cases.
Next, the fact that the dissenting judge in a case chooses
to file a dissent that is only partial—as opposed to a complete
dissent—may reflect greater panel homogeneity, and may
correlate with more expressions of collegiality. Hypothesis
Case-2 captures this notion.
• Hypothesis Case-2 (Partial Dissent Hypothesis):
Expressions of collegiality in dissent are more likely to
135. See David C. Vladeck & Mitu Gulati, Judicial Triage: Reflections on the
Debate over Unpublished Opinions, 62 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1667, 1668–73 (2005);
Alex Kozinski & Stephen Reinhardt, Please Don’t Cite This! Why We Don’t Allow
Citation to Unpublished Dispositions, CAL. LAW. 43, 43 (2000) (“While [an
unpublished disposition] can often be prepared in a few hours, [a published]
opinion generally takes many days (often weeks, sometimes months) of drafting,
editing, polishing, revising.”); id. at 44 (Published “[o]pinions take up a
disproportionate share of the court’s time even after they are filed.”).
136. See supra notes 91–92 and accompanying text.
137. See, e.g., 4TH CIR. R. 32.1.
138. See supra note 67 and accompanying text; Kozinski & Reinhardt, supra
note 135, at 44 (“[T]he phrasing (as opposed to the result) of [an unpublished
disposition] is given relatively little scrutiny by the other chambers; dissents and
concurrences are rare.”); id. (“If [unpublished dispositions] could be cited as
precedent, . . . [u]npublished concurrences and dissents would become much more
common, as individual judges would feel obligated to clarify their differences with
the majority, even when those differences had no bearing on the case before
them.”).
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be found in cases where the dissenting opinion is
partial, not full.
Beyond features of the case itself, features of the panel
hearing the case may affect the frequency of expressions of
collegiality in dissent. In particular, greater panel
homogeneity may correspond to a lower frequency of such
expressions.
First, consider that the dissenting judge in a case on the
one hand, and the judges joining to form the majority on the
other hand, may sometimes have different ideological
frames—which I capture here by reference to the party of the
President who appointed the judges. 139 We may perceive of
three competing hypotheses in cases of “ideological
dissent”—that is, cases in which the two judges comprising
the panel majority were appointed by Presidents of one
political party, and the dissenting judge was appointed by a
President of the other party. First, the absence of
homogeneity between majority and dissent may make
expressions of collegiality by the dissent less likely. 140
Second, in contrast, a judge filing an “ideological dissent”
might be inclined to express collegiality toward the majority
on the logic that the media, or the public, might focus on
those cases in particular as cases where collegiality might be
strained, 141 or on the logic that in fact such cases reflect truly
divergent policy preferences. 142 Finally, the core conception
of judicial collegiality holds that judges will respect each
other’s views and be open to those with differing views. 143 On
139. This is standard in the literature on decision making by the federal courts
of appeals. See, e.g., Fischman & Law, supra note 64, at 167–68.
140. See, e.g., Tonja Jacobi & Dylan Schweers, Justice, Interrupted: The Effect
of Gender, Ideology, and Seniority at Supreme Court Oral Arguments, 103 VA. L.
REV. 1379, 1472 (2017) (finding evidence supporting the notion that conservatives
tend to interrupt liberals, and liberals tend to interrupt conservatives, at
Supreme Court oral arguments).
141. See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
142. See supra notes 62–63 and accompanying text.
143. Cf. Edwards & Livermore, supra note 4, at 1956–57 (portion of pape
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this logic, one would not expect to find more, or fewer,
expressions of collegiality in cases of ideological dissent.
These competing predictions are captured by Hypotheses
Case-3A, Case-3B, and Case-3C (the Ideological
Hypotheses).
• Hypothesis Case-3A (Ideological Heterogeneity
Hypothesis): Expressions of collegiality in dissent are
less likely to be found in cases where the judges in the
majority were both appointed by Presidents of the
same political party, while the dissenting judge was
appointed by a President of the other political party.
• Hypothesis Case-3B (Ideological Public Consumption
Hypothesis): Expressions of collegiality in dissent are
more likely to be found in cases where the judges in
the majority were both appointed by Presidents of the
same political party, while the dissenting judge was
appointed by a President of the other political party.
• Hypothesis Case-3C (Ideological Null Hypothesis):
Expressions of collegiality in dissent are neither more
nor less likely to be found in cases where the judges in
the majority were both appointed by Presidents of the
same political party, while the dissenting judge was
appointed by a President of the other political party.
Second, commentators have often hypothesized and
observed that women generally are more cooperative than
men in group settings. 144 Recent research has found such
behavior to extend to judges: Professor Tonja Jacobi and
Dylan Schweers present empirical findings that male
Supreme Court Justices interrupt their colleagues far more

written solely by Judge Edwards; finding “examples of hard and very hard cases,
involving mixed panels in which the decision of the court is unanimous”).
144. See, e.g., Catherine C. Eckel & Philip J. Grossman, Are Women Less
Selfish than Men?: Evidence from Dictator Experiments, 108 ECON. J. 726, 730
(1998) (finding that “women donate, on average, about twice what men donate”
in interactive experiments).

1612

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 70

frequently than do female Justices at oral argument. 145 On
this basis, one might expect female judges to express
collegiality in dissent more than their male counterparts;
Hypothesis Case-4 captures this idea.
• Hypothesis Case-4 (Gender Hypothesis): Expressions
of collegiality in dissent are more likely to be found in
cases where the dissenting judge is female.
A third point related to panel composition is that
sometimes a panel consists of judges other than the judges
(regular or senior) of the court of appeals—whether judges
from districts within the circuit or judges from other circuits.
These judges are less familiar with the regular circuit
judges. 146 The discussion above provides competing
predictions as to whether such settings will be more, or
less, 147 likely to generate expressions of collegiality. These
competing predictions are captured by Hypotheses Case-5A
and Case-5B (the Sitting by Designation Hypotheses).
• Hypothesis
Case-5A
(Sitting
by Designation
Hypothesis, version A): Expressions of collegiality in
dissent are more likely to be found in cases where the
dissenting judge is sitting by designation.
• Hypothesis
Case-5B
(Sitting
by Designation
Hypothesis, version B): Expressions of collegiality in
dissent are less likely to be found in cases where the
dissenting judge is sitting by designation.

145. See Jacobi & Schweers, supra note 140, at 1463 (“[W]e consistently see
that the male Justices interrupt at a far higher rate than the female Justices.”).
146. See Wasby, supra note 11, at 118–19 (interviews with Ninth Circuit judges
indicating that they generally are less familiar with, and communicate less with,
district judges who sit by designation). But cf. id. at 120–21 (suggesting that
collegiality between circuit judges and district judges increases as a result of
district judges sitting by designation).
147. Cf. Wald, supra note 11, at 524 (“An observer of appellate courts . . .
notices that senior judges tend not to ask questions from the bench or spend time
explaining or even justifying their votes to colleagues.”).
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2. Court of Appeals-Supreme Court Comparative
Hypothesis
The discussion to this point suggests that expressions of
collegiality in dissent should be more common on the
Supreme Court than on the courts of appeals. There are five
reasons for this. First, while courts of appeals generally hear
cases in panels of three, 148 all the Justices participate in
deciding the cases on the Supreme Court’s docket. Second,
with the exception of the First Circuit, all the courts of
appeals have more judges than the Supreme Court has
Justices. 149 Third, while the Supreme Court Justices all
maintain home chambers in the same building, this is true
among the regional courts of appeals only for the District of
Columbia Circuit. Fourth, the Supreme Court attracts
considerably more media attention than do the courts of
appeals. 150 Finally, while the Supreme Court publishes all
its cases, the courts of appeals publish only a fraction of their
cases. Thus, especially given the low overall level of media
coverage of the courts of appeals, the number of cases that
are likely to attract any media coverage at all is
comparatively minute. Accordingly, as Hypothesis
Comparative-1 predicts, one would expect the Supreme
Court to exhibit more expressions of collegiality in dissent.
• Hypothesis Comparative-1 (Frequency Hypothesis):
Expressions of collegiality in dissenting opinions will
be less common across the federal courts of appeals
than in the United States Supreme Court.

148. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 46(b), (c).
149. See id. § 44(a).
150. See ASHLYN K. KUERSTEN & DONALD R. SONGER, DECISIONS ON THE U.S.
COURTS OF APPEALS 1 (2001) (“The Courts of Appeals are virtually invisible to
most Americans . . . They receive little media coverage because their decisions
are often less dramatic than the pronouncements of the Supreme Court . . .”);
Corey Rayburn Yung, Judged by the Company You Keep: An Empirical Study of
Judges on the United States Courts of Appeals, 51 B.C. L. REV. 1133, 1137 (2010)
(“[T]he actions of the Supreme Court attract greater attention . . .”).
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3. Court-Level Hypotheses
Consider first that judges who are more familiar with
one another will be more collegial. It stands to reason that
the greater the number of judges on a court, the less familiar
judges may be with one another. On this basis, Hypothesis
Court-1 predicts that larger courts will be less collegial.
• Hypothesis Court-1 (Court Size Hypothesis): The
greater the number of authorized seats on a court of
appeals, the lower the expressions of collegiality in
dissent.
Along similar lines, one might expect that the greater the
number of courthouses in which judges on a court maintain
chambers, the fewer the interactions among the judges, and
concomitantly the lower the collegiality. 151 Hypothesis
Court-2 captures this notion.
• Hypothesis Court-2 (Courthouse Hypothesis): The
greater the number of courthouses that are home to
judges’ chambers, the lower the expressions of
collegiality in dissent.
Next, one might anticipate that a court’s higher

151. See Murphy, supra note 9, at 458–59 (“Collegiality requires a familiarity
with other judges, which occurs only with regular face-to-face contact.”); Michael
J. Nelson, Morgan L.W. Hazelton & Rachael K. Hinkle, How Interpersonal
Contact Affects Appellate Review, 84 J. POL. 573, 575–77 (2022) (finding that
appellate judges who sit on panels reviewing Fourth Amendment cases are more
likely to vote with the district judges below when the judges have chambers in
the same courthouse); see also Morgan L.W. Hazelton, Rachael K. Hinkle &
Michael J. Nelson, The Elevator Effect: Collegiality and Consensus in Judicial
Decisionmaking 10–11, 22–23 (working paper presented April 4, 2019, at the
University of Chicago Law School Judicial Behavior Workshop) (on file with
author) (using whether judges work in the same city as a predictor of likely
collegiality); Rachael Hinkle, Morgan Hazelton & Michael Nelson, Legal
Scholarship Highlight: Getting to Know You—The Unifying Effects of
Membership Stability, SCOTUSBLOG (May 26, 2017, 12:11 PM),
https://www.scotusblog.com/2017/05/legal-scholarship-highlight-getting-knowunifying-effects-membership-stability/ (marshalling empirical evidence to show
that judges who serve together for longer periods of time are less likely to issue
opinions dissenting from one another).
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workload may displace some expressions of collegiality. 152
Hypothesis Court-3 asserts this, making use of court docket
size as a proxy for workload. 153
• Hypothesis Court-3 (Docket Size Hypothesis): The
greater the number of cases per judge, the lower the
expressions of collegiality in dissent.
One might expect greater homogeneity among judges on
a court to translate to greater collegiality. Hypotheses Court4 and Court-5 make this assertion, using dissent rates, 154
and judges’ ideologies, 155 respectively, as proxies for
heterogeneity. Hypothesis Court-5 also receives support
from the notion that expressions of collegiality will be more
likely in settings that are more likely to attract public
attention and media coverage. 156
• Hypothesis Court-4 (Rate of Dissent Hypothesis): The
greater the percentage of cases in which there is a
dissent, the lower the expressions of collegiality in
dissent.
• Hypothesis Court-5 (Judicial Ideological Heterogeneity
Hypothesis): The more ideologically heterogeneous
the court of appeals, the lower the expressions of
collegiality in dissent.

152. See Patricia M. Wald, The Problem with the Courts: Black-Robed
Bureaucracy, or Collegiality Under Challenge?, 42 MD. L. REV. 766, 769 (1983)
(noting the challenge to collegiality posed by growing caseloads); Wald, supra
note 11, at 527 (same).
153. To the extent that it is costlier to omit, rather than include, expressions
of collegiality, see supra text accompanying note 108, then one might expect a
higher workload to correspond to greater measures of collegiality. The data below
tend to refute this alternate hypothesis. See infra tbl. 12.
154. See supra note 14 and accompanying text; Wald, supra note 11, at 523
(“[T]he push toward consensus is a familiar part of appellate court life.”).
155. See Jonathan P. Kastellec, Hierarchical and Collegial Politics on the U.S.
Courts of Appeals, 73 J. POL. 345 (2011) (providing empirical evidence that the
ideological composition of the Supreme Court, and whole circuit, affects the
dispositions and votes of three-judge panels).
156. See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
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The remaining court-level hypotheses use the population
within the circuit’s geographic reach as a proxy for the judges
who sit on the court of appeals. First, the size of a circuit’s
geographic scope might be a proxy for the heterogeneity of
the population, which in turn may be a proxy for the
heterogeneity of the judges on the court. 157 Hypothesis
Court-6 captures this notion.
• Hypothesis Court-6 (Geographic Size Hypothesis): The
larger the geographic region covered by a circuit, the
lower the expressions of collegiality in dissent.
Second, it is sometimes said that rural areas are politer
and friendlier than urban ones. 158 Perhaps, then, judges on
courts with a greater percentage of rural areas will be more
collegial. Hypothesis Court-7 expresses this idea.
• Hypothesis Court-7 (Rural-Urban Hypothesis): The
greater the percentage of a circuit is categorized as
rural, the greater the expressions of collegiality in
dissent.
Last, consider assertions that some regions within the
United States—specifically, the South and Midwest—are

157. Some judges suggest that the geographic size of a circuit may have a direct
effect on court collegiality. See Wasby, supra note 11, at 79–81 (noting the
implications of the Ninth Circuit’s sprawling geography on collegiality); Tacha,
supra note 7, at 589 (making a similar point for the Tenth Circuit); Wald, supra
note 11, at 527 (“With circuits so farflung and schedules so crowded, it is amazing
how little one sees of one[‘]s own colleagues even in in the same building.”). I
conclude that the better measure is not how far apart judges’ Chambers are from
one another, but rather the extent to which Chambers lie in distinct courthouses
(whatever the distances between them). That said, one yet might think that a
circuit’s geographic scope acts as a proxy for heterogeneity among the court’s
judges. See COHEN, supra note 58, at 153 (noting that interviews with circuit
judges disclosed that “[t[he only way in which there was any hint that the court’s
geographic span might have an effect is in the diversity of the judges who sit on
the cases”).
158. See, e.g., Joseph Newman & Clark McCauley, Eye Contact with Strangers
in City, Suburb, and Small Town, 9 ENV’T & BEHAVIOR 547 (1977) (presenting
empirical evidence consistent with the notion that people in rural settings are
more polite and friendlier than those in urban settings).
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politer or friendlier than other regions. 159 If politeness breeds
collegiality, then perhaps courts that include portions of
those regions will exhibit more frequent expressions of
collegiality in dissent. 160 Hypothesis Court-8 captures this
notion.
• Hypothesis Court-8 (Regional Nature Hypothesis): The
politer and friendlier the region(s) covered by a circuit,
the greater the expressions of collegiality in dissent.
B. Empirical Analysis of Case-Level Hypotheses
I used the case-level dataset to check the accuracy of
case-level Hypotheses Case-1 through Case-4. I deployed a
logistic regression using the “Any Collegiality” variable—and
an ordered logistic regression using the “Total Collegiality”
measure—to test the first four hypotheses. In addition to the
key dependent variables—whether the opinion was
published, whether the dissent was partial, whether the
majority and dissent broke along ideological lines, and
whether the dissenting judge was female—I also included as
an independent variable whether the dissenting judge was
appointed by a Republican President. Table 6 presents the

159. See, e.g., Peter J. Rentfrow, Samuel D. Gosling, Markus Jokela, David J.
Stillwell, Michal Kosinski & Jeff Potter, Divided We Stand: Three Psychological
Regions of the United States and Their Political, Economic, Social, and Health
Correlates, 105J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. 996, 1006–07 (2013) (using
empirical data to describe an area of the U.S.—consisting largely of the Midwest
and South—where residents are in general aptly characterized as “friendly and
conventional”).
160. The Fourth Circuit may provide an example of a circuit seeming to
conform to its regional collegial identity. See Courtroom Protocol for Counsel, U.S.
CT.
OF
APPEALS
FOR
THE
4TH
CIR.
(Oct.
9,
2019),
https://www.ca4.uscourts.gov/docs/pdfs/courtroomprotocol.pdf (“The judges come
down from the bench after each case to shake hands with counsel and thank them
for their advocacy.”); Levine, supra note 10 (describing speech by Judge Harris)
(“The judges follow every conference with a social lunch. Harris admits she was
skeptical about this at first because her inclination was to decompress alone after
conference. That changed after she joined the Fourth Circuit. ‘It’s a key ritual of
collegiality making manifest that the disagreements about cases have no
consequences for our personal interactions.’”).
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results for the logistic regression, and Table 7 presents the
results for the ordered logistic regression.
Tables 6 and 7 provide strong evidence to support
Hypotheses Case-1. As Table 6 reflects, the rate at which
dissenting opinions in cases used collegial language to refer
to majority opinions or majority judges—or majority opinions
used collegial language to refer to dissenting opinions—was
statistically different in published as opposed to unpublished
cases. 161 Table 7 reports a similar result for the Collegiality
Sum measure. (Interestingly, Table 7 also suggests that
judges appointed by Republican Presidents are more likely
to employ more expressions of collegiality in their dissenting
opinions than are judges appointed by Democratic
Presidents.) 162

161. To minimize concerns over lack of independence in the observations, I ran
the same regression clustering standard errors at the judge-level; other than a
reduction in the significance of the constant to the 5% level, the results were the
same. Also, though I do not report the tests, I ran similar tests for all the different
metrics of collegiality, and found similar statistically significant results. I also
found similarly statistically significant results for cases where the majority
opinion was, or was not, issued per curiam. Cf. Wald, supra note 11, at 523 (“A
graphic example of the ‘safety in numbers’ syndrome is the use by courts of the
per curiam decision. No one judge is officially singled out as author of the
opinions. Criticism must therefore be directed at the group, not at any single
judge.”).
162. I also ran the same regression clustering standard errors at the judgelevel. The publication decision remained statistically significant at the 1% level,
but the party of the appointing President was no longer statistically significant.
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TABLE 6. Logistic regression (with robust standard
errors) of whether a dissenting opinion used any collegial
language in respect of the majority opinion.
Variable
Was the
opinion
published?
Was the dissent
partial?
Did the
majority and
dissent break
along
ideological
lines?
Was the
dissenting
judge male?
Was the
dissenting
judge appointed
by a
Republican
President?
constant

Coefficient
(Odds Ratio)

Robust
Standard
Error

p-value

0.754
(2.126)

0.217

0.001***

0.055
(1.057)

0.236

0.815

0.055
(1.057)

0.216

0.798

-0.123
(0.884)

0.229

0.592

0.147
(1.158)

0.216

0.497

0.678

0.257

0.008***

N = 527. *** = significant at the 1% level. ** =
significant at the 5% level. * = significant at the 10%
level. Pseudo-R2 = 0.022.
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TABLE 7. Ordered logistic regression (with robust standard
errors) of the Collegial Sum used by dissenting opinions.
Variable
Was the
opinion
published?
Was the dissent
partial?
Did the
majority and
dissent break
along
ideological
lines?
Was the
dissenting
judge male?
Was the
dissenting
judge appointed
by a
Republican
President?

Coefficient
(Odds Ratio)

Robust
Standard
Error

p-value

0.889
(2.432)

0.184

0.000***

0.188
(1.206)

0.198

0.344

0.116
(1.123)

0.178

0.515

0.045
(1.046)

0.177

0.799

0.362
(1.437)

0.178

0.042**

N = 527. *** = significant at the 1% level. ** =
significant at the 5% level. * = significant at the 10%
level. Pseudo-R2 = 0.0260.

Hypothesis Case-2 contended that expressions of
collegiality would be more common in partial dissents than
in full dissents. As Tables 6 and 7 reveal, the data do not
support this hypothesis.
Recall that Hypotheses Case-3 offered competing takes
on whether an ideological divide between the majority and
dissent would affect the likelihood of expressions of
collegiality. My own prediction was that there would be no
such relationship, i.e., that the null hypothesis (expressed by
Hypothesis Case-3B) would hold. The empirical evidence is
indeed consistent with Hypothesis Case-3B: I found no
statistically significant relationship between the presence of
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an ideological divide and an expression of respect. Of course,
absence of evidence of a statistical relationship is not
evidence of absence of a relationship. Still, the statistical test
does not approach significance, even at the 10% level, for
either measure.
Hypothesis Case-4 posited that female dissenting judges
would be more likely to express collegiality than male
dissenting judges. As Tables 6 and 7 show, the data do not
support this hypothesis.
Hypotheses Case-5 proposed different conceptions of the
relationship between judges sitting by designation and
expressions of collegiality. The empirical evidence provides
some support for each of these conceptions. Table 8 looks at
the set of published cases and shows that, with statistical
significance (at the 10% level, and approaching significance
at the 5% level), a dissenting judge sitting by designation was
more likely to express collegiality than was a dissenting
judge not sitting by designation. 163 This is consistent with
Hypothesis Case-5A.

163. With two dissents authored by judges sitting by designation not
expressing “respect” for the majority, the results approached significance at the
10% level (p = 0.128) for the set of all cases.
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TABLE 8. Correlation in published cases between
whether the dissenting judge was sitting by designation and
whether the dissenting opinion uses any collegial language
in respect of the majority opinion or judges.
Whether the dissent uses any collegial
language in respect of the majority
opinion or judges.

Whether the
dissenting
judge was
sitting by
designation.

No

Yes

Total

No

70
(19.55)

288
(80.45)

358
(100.00)

Yes

0
(0.00)

14
(100.00)

14
(100.00)

Total

70
(18.82)

302
(81.18)

372
(100.00)

Note: Row percentages are reported in parentheses. The pvalue from a Fisher’s exact test is 0.082.
Key: * represents significance at the 10% level, **
represents significance at the 5% level, and *** represents
significance at the 1% level.

But there is also empirical evidence supporting
Hypothesis Case-5B, to the effect that judges sitting by
designation are less likely to express collegiality. Table 9
shows (again for published opinions) a more nuanced view of
the practices of judges sitting by designation. Instead of
considering whether the dissenting judge expressed any
collegiality (as did Table 8), Table 9 presents data on the
total number of ways the dissenting judge expressed
collegiality. Once again, judges sitting by designation
expressed
collegiality
differently,
with
statistical
significance (at the 1% level), than did judges not sitting by
designation. 164 Table 8 reveals, however, not only that judges
sitting by designation were more likely to express some

164. The result was similar and significant at the 5% level for all cases (p =
0.033).
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collegiality (than to express no collegiality) than were judges
not sitting by designation, but also that judges sitting by
designation were likely to express collegiality only once
(most likely by noting a “respectful” dissent), while judges
not sitting by designation were more likely to engage in
multiple expressions of collegiality. The latter conclusion is
consistent with Hypothesis Case-5B.
TABLE 9: Correlation in published cases between whether
the dissenting judge was sitting by designation and the
number of ways the dissenting opinion uses collegial
language in respect of the majority opinion or judges.

Whether the
dissenting
judge was
sitting by
designation.

No
Yes
Total

The number of ways the dissenting
opinion uses collegial language in
respect of the majority opinion or
judges.
0
1
2
3
TOTAL
70
194
86
8
358
(19.55) (54.19) (24.02) (2.23) (100.00)
0
14
0
0
14
(0.00) (100.00) (0.00) (0.00) (100.00)
70
208
86
8
372
(18.82) (55.91) (23.12) (2.15) (100.00)

Note: Row percentages are reported in parentheses. The pvalue from a Fisher’s exact test is 0.007***.
Key: * represents significance at the 10% level, **
represents significance at the 5% level, and *** represents
significance at the 1% level.

C. Empirical Analysis of Comparative Court Hypothesis
In order to compare practices of collegiality in dissent
between the courts of appeals and the Supreme Court, I
compiled a Supreme Court dataset. Because some Supreme
Court cases include multiple dissents, the unit of analysis in
the Supreme Court database is the dissent. 165 I used the
165. By contrast, since each case in the case-level dataset contains exactly one
dissent, the unit of analysis for the case-level dataset can be said equivalently to
be either the case or the dissent.
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same search term I used for the case-level dataset to identify
Supreme Court cases decided during 2016 with a majority
opinion and at least one dissenting opinion. 166 The Supreme
Court dataset consists of 46 dissenting opinions (spread over
36 cases). Table 10 presents a summary of the distribution of
these dissents.
TABLE 10. Frequency of various means of expressing
collegiality in Supreme Court dissenting opinions (row
percentages in parentheses).

All
Dissents
Cases
with Per
Curiam
Majority
Opinions
Cases
with
Signed
Majority
Opinions

Number of
Dissenting
Opinions
Expressing
“Respectful”
Dissent

Number of
Dissenting
Opinions
Referring
to the
Majority
as the
“Court” or
“Panel”

33
(71.74)

43
(93.48)

Number of
Dissenting
Opinions
Referring to
the Majority
Judges as
“Colleagues,”
“Friends,” or
“CoPanelists”
0
(0.00)

1
(33.33)

3
(100.00)

0
(100.00)

3
(100.00)

32
(74.42)

40
(93.02)

0
(0.00)

43
(100.00)

Total

46
(100.00)

I used the Supreme Court and case-level court of appeals
datasets to check the accuracy of Hypothesis Comparative-1.
166. I searched in Westlaw’s collection of Supreme Court decisions using the
search: ‘advanced: DA(aft 12-31-2015 & bef 01-01-2017) & SY(dissenting).’ The
search generated 38 cases. I dropped one case that had no dissenting opinion
(that the search generated because the word “dissenting” appeared in the case
syllabus), and another case with two dissents that featured only a plurality
opinion.
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As Table 11 reflects, consistent with Hypothesis
Comparative-1’s prediction, Supreme Court dissents reflect
collegiality toward the majority opinion and Justices, with
statistical significance, more often than do dissents at the
courts of appeals. Indeed, 100% of the dissents in the
Supreme Court dataset include such expressions. 167
TABLE 11. Correlation between whether the dissent was filed
in a Supreme Court case and whether the dissenting opinion
uses any collegial language in respect of the majority opinion
or judges.
Whether the dissent uses any
collegial language in respect of
the majority opinion or judges.

Whether the
dissent was
filed in a
Supreme
Court case.

No

Yes

Total

No

121
(22.96)

406
(77.04)

527
(100.00)

Yes

0
(0.00)

46
(100.00)

46
(100.00)

Total

121
(21.12)

452
(78.88)

573
(100.00)

Note: Row percentages are reported in parentheses. The pvalue from a Fisher’s exact test is 0.000***.
Key: * represents significance at the 10% level, **
represents significance at the 5% level, and *** represents
significance at the 1% level.

167. Interestingly, none of the Supreme Court dissents refers to the majority
Justices as “colleagues” or “friends.” Also, court of appeals dissents make use of
the word “respect” to refer to the majority opinion or judges at essentially the
same rate (70.68%) as do Supreme Court dissents (71.74%). However, every
Supreme Court dissent in the dataset that does not use the word “respect” does
refer to the majority as “the Court” at least once (though many opinions also refer
to “the majority”).
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D. Empirical Analysis of Court-Level Hypotheses
I used the case-level dataset to check the accuracy of
court-level Hypotheses Court-1 through Court-7. The limited
size of the court-level dataset—only 12 units—precluded
meaningful statistical analysis. Accordingly, I restricted
myself to checking on the presence of correlations in
evaluating the various hypotheses. Table 12 presents these
correlations (for all hypothesis except Hypothesis Court-7),
broken down in panels for (a) all cases, (b) all published
cases, (c) all cases except those with a dissent authored by a
judge sitting by designation, and (d) all published cases
except those with a dissent authored by a judge sitting by
designation. 168
Perusal of Table 12 reveals that most correlation
coefficients change substantially depending on the set of
cases from which they emerge. In order to evaluate the
strength of the relationship between collegiality and the
various variables, I divided the variables into three
categories. First, some variables had correlation coefficients
that were uniformly (or almost uniformly) substantial
correlation coefficients: population, authorized judgeships,
and courthouses. For these variables, I concluded that the
relationship between them and collegiality was high. A
second category of variables produced correlation coefficients
that were low across almost all measures of collegiality and
sets of cases: ideological homogeneity and dissent rate. For
these variables, I concluded that the relationship between
them and collegiality was low. Finally, for the remaining
third set of variables, the correlation coefficients were
mixed—some of them were low and some of them were high.
I did not take such results as evidence supporting these
hypotheses.

168. Table 4, above, presented some of the results included in the more
complete Table 10.
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TABLE 12. Correlations of the measures of collegiality with
court-level variables.

All Cases

All Cases Except
Published Cases
Those with
Except Those
Dissents
with Dissents
Published Cases
Authored by
Authored by
Judges Sitting
Judges Sitting by
Designation
by Designation

Any

Total

Any

Total

Any

Total

Any

Total

-0.402

-0.53

-0.442

-0.352

-0.217

-0.401

-0.254

-0.391

Courthouses

-0.315 -0.572

-0.528

-0.588

-0.167

-0.508

-0.198

-0.497

Caseload per
Judgeship

-0.241 -0.487

-0.442

-0.352

-0.137

-0.411

-0.205

-0.417

Dissent Rate

-0.313 0.206

-0.528

-0.588

-0.204

0.369

-0.15

0.375

Court
Ideological
Homogeneity

-0.42

-0.121

-0.442

-0.352

-0.468

-0.081

-0.458

-0.086

Total Area 169

-0.376 -0.418

-0.528

-0.588

-0.193

-0.3

-0.218

-0.291

Rural
Fraction 170

-0.004 -0.229

-0.442

-0.352

-0.073

-0.29

-0.055

-0.280

Authorized
Judgeships

Hypothesis Court-1 predicted that a higher number of
authorized judgeships will correlate with lower collegiality.
As expected, the correlation coefficients here were uniformly
negative, and mostly substantial. There is, in short, evidence
supporting this hypothesis.
Hypothesis Court-2 claimed that a circuit with a higher
number of courthouses serving as home chambers to judges
will have lower collegiality. As expected, the correlation
coefficients here were uniformly negative and also uniformly
substantial. There is, then, strong evidence supporting this
In running these correlations, I excluded the District of Columbia Circuit.
I also coded for each circuit the total land area covered by each circuit, and
ran correlations using that variable. The results were substantially the same as
for total area.
170 In running these correlations, I excluded the District of Columbia Circuit.
169
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hypothesis.
Hypothesis Court-3 asserted that a circuit with a higher
caseload will exhibit lower collegiality. As expected, the
correlation coefficients here were all negative and rather
substantial. There is, in short, some evidence supporting this
hypothesis.
Hypothesis Court-4 claimed that circuits with higher
dissent rates will have lower collegiality. The correlation
coefficients here had mixed signs and were uniformly
insubstantial. Contrary to Judge Edwards’ assertions, the
evidence does not support this hypothesis.
Hypothesis Court-5 predicted that judicial ideological
heterogeneity will translate to fewer expressions of
collegiality. The correlation coefficients here were mostly,
but not entirely, negative, and they were generally
insubstantial. Thus, the existing evidence does not support
this hypothesis.
Hypothesis Court-6 asserted that the greater area
covered by a circuit, the lower the collegiality. On the
understanding that the hypothesis rested on the notion of
“sprawl” leading to lower collegiality, my primary test of the
hypothesis relied on using “total area” as the proxy for
geographic area. As expected, the correlation coefficients I
found were negative and, though somewhat mixed, were
largely substantial. There was at least moderate support for
this hypothesis.
Hypothesis Court-7 predicted that more rural circuits
will be more collegial. Contrary to this prediction, the
correlation coefficients here were uniformly negative.
However, they were also nearly uniformly insubstantial. In
sum, there is no evidence to support this hypothesis.
Hypothesis Court-8 predicted a positive relationship
between regional politeness and court collegiality. The data
do not provide support for this hypothesis. The Fourth, Fifth,
Sixth, and Eleventh Circuits include states that lie within
the southeast census region (which corresponds broadly to
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most conceptions of the southern U.S., an area reputed to be
especially polite), yet the data (as reflected in Table 3 above)
indicate that these circuits are not especially collegial.
(Indeed, the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits lie near the bottom
of the circuits on some collegiality measures.) The Midwest—
another region reputed to be polite—does a little better, but
again the Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits (which
include portions of the Midwest) are not near the top of the
collegiality measures. It bears noting that two circuits that
include portions of the Southeast (one of which also includes
part of the Midwest) have had internal operating
controversies. Evidence suggests that the Fifth Circuit
stacked panels in civil rights cases in the late 1950s and early
1960s in order to ensure liberal Republican majorities. 171
More recently, some Sixth Circuit judges have alleged
improprieties in selecting the relevant judges to decide
cases. 172 While both these controversies now lie in the distant
past—the latter over a decade ago, and the former more than
a half century ago—it is conceivable that they yet may
contribute
some
suspicion—and
perhaps
some
uncollegiality—into the court’s operations today. It is also
plausible that one or both of these episodes represent signs

171. See J. Robert Brown, Jr. & Allison Herren Lee, Neutral Assignment of
Judges at the Court of Appeals, 78 TEX. L. REV. 1037, 1044–65 (2000) (discussing
“panel packing” by the Fifth Circuit in the late 1950s and early 1960s in civil
rights cases).
172. Compare Grutter v. Bollinger, 288 F.3d 732, 753–758 (6th Cir. 2002)
(Moore, J., concurring) (responding to the complaint, lodged by Judge Boggs’s
dissenting opinion, that “the present case has been decided by a nine-judge en
banc court . . . rather than an eleven-judge en banc court, and that the members
of the hearing panel originally assigned this case . . . purposefully engineered this
result”), aff’d on unrelated grounds, 537 U.S. 1043 (2002), and id. at 772 (Clay,
J., concurring) (“[T]he dissent’s new-found allegations of impropriety as to the
course this matter followed in reaching the en banc court simply defy belief. It is
ludicrous to think that with our circuit operating with only one-half of the active
judges’ positions filled, and with over 4000 cases reaching our Court each year,
the Chief Judge or any members of this Court would single out any one particular
case and maneuver the system for a particular outcome.”), with id. at 810–14
(Boggs, J., dissenting) (“Procedural Appendix,” alleging procedural irregularities
in constituting the court to hear the case).

1630

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 70

or symptoms of uncollegiality at the time that yet persists
today.
V. DISCUSSION OF RESULTS
The preceding Part established support for some (but not
all) case-level hypotheses and some (but not all) court-level
hypotheses. Table 13 presents a summary of the findings.
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TABLE 13. Summary of findings.
Was there support for the
hypothesis?
Case-level hypotheses
Hypothesis Case-1 (Publication
Yes (***)
Hypothesis)
Hypothesis Case-2 (Partial
No
Dissent Hypothesis)
Hypothesis Case-3A (Ideological
No
Heterogeneity Hypothesis)
Hypothesis Case-3B (Ideological
No
Public Consumption Hypothesis)
Hypothesis Case-3C (Ideological
Data were consistent with the
Null Hypothesis)
null hypothesis.
Hypothesis Case-4 (Gender
No
Hypothesis)
Dissenting judges sitting by
designation were more likely to
Hypothesis Case-5 (Sitting by
express collegiality at all (*), but
Designation Hypotheses)
less likely to express collegiality
in more than one way (**).
Supreme Court-courts of appeals comparative hypothesis
Hypothesis Comparative-1
Yes (***)
(Frequency Hypothesis)
Court-level hypotheses
Hypothesis Court-1 (Court Size
Yes
Hypothesis)
Hypothesis Court-2 (Courthouse
Yes
Hypothesis)
Hypothesis Court-3 (Docket Size
Some
Hypothesis)
Hypothesis Court-4 (Rate of
No
Dissent Hypothesis)
Hypothesis Court-5 (Judicial
Ideological Heterogeneity
No
Hypothesis)
Hypothesis Court-6 (Geographic
Some
Size Hypothesis)
Hypothesis Court-7 (Rural-Urban
No
Hypothesis)
Hypothesis Court-8 (Regional
No
Nature Hypothesis)
Hypothesis
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Considering first case-level hypotheses, the data provide
support for the hypothesis that dissents are more likely to
express collegiality in published cases (Hypothesis Case-1).
This conclusion bolsters the notion that dissents are more
likely to express collegiality when the majority opinion is
drafted by a judge herself (or by her personal law clerks), and
that dissents are more likely to express collegiality when the
case is one that is more likely to draw the attention of
lawyers, the media, and the public generally.
The data did not provide support for a couple of
hypotheses that looked to the homogeneity (or lack thereof)
of the panel hearing the case. The evidence did not support
the hypothesis that expressions of collegiality would be more
frequent in cases where the dissent was partial (Hypothesis
Case-2). Neither did the data support the hypothesis that
expressions of collegiality would be less frequent in cases
where the panel broke along an ideological divide
(Hypothesis Case-3A). On the other hand, the data also did
not support the complementary hypothesis that, owing to the
likelihood of public consumption, expressions of collegiality
would be more frequent where the panel broke along an
ideological
divide.
Rather—consistent
with
broad
understandings of judicial collegiality—there was no
evidence that ideology had any impact on the frequency of
expressions of collegiality.
The data did not support the hypothesis that female
judges would more frequently express collegiality in dissent
than male judges (Hypothesis Case-4). Interestingly,
however, there was some evidence that the hypothesis did
hold for judges appointed by Democratic Presidents.
Finally, the data provided insights into competing
conceptions of the behavior of dissenting judges who are
sitting by designation. On the one hand, judges sitting by
designation are more likely to express collegiality in some
way toward the majority judges or opinion than are judges
not sitting by designation (Hypothesis Case-5A). On the
other hand, judges not sitting by designation are more likely
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to deploy more cumulative expressions of collegiality toward
the majority judges or opinion (Hypothesis Case-5B).
Turning to the court-level hypotheses, the data
supported the hypotheses that arose out of the notion that
more frequent interactions among judges would correlate
with greater expressions of collegiality in dissent. The
evidence showed that expressions of collegiality in dissent
were greater on courts with fewer authorized judgeships
(Hypothesis Court-1), on courts with judges stationed in
fewer courthouses (Hypothesis Court-2), and on courts with
lower workloads (Hypothesis Court-3).
In contrast, the data did not disclose any effect of
homogeneity on the frequency with which dissenting judges
expressed collegiality. Neither dissent rate (Hypothesis
Court-4) nor court ideological homogeneity (Hypothesis
Court-5) were strongly correlated with the frequency of
expression of collegiality in dissent.
The hypotheses relying on characteristics of the
geographic region covered by the circuit as a proxy for the
homogeneity of the judges on the court largely failed to
attract support from the data. There was some evidence that
the size of the geographic area covered by the circuit—a
proxy for regional heterogeneity 173—correlated with
expressions of collegiality in dissent (Hypothesis Court-6).
However, expressions of collegiality in dissent did not
correlate with either the percentage of circuit area
categorized as rural (Hypothesis Court-7). And, to the extent
that certain regions of the United States are seen as
friendlier or more polite, circuits including those regions did
not generally exhibit greater expressions of collegiality in
dissent (Hypothesis Court-8).
Finally, looking to comparative collegiality, the evidence
supports the hypothesis that the Supreme Court exhibits
more expressions of collegiality in dissent than do the federal

173. See supra note 157 and accompanying text.
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courts of appeals (Hypothesis Comparative-1).
The evidence here provides some support for Judge
Edwards’ arguments about collegiality, but it also draws
some of his contentions in question. The evidence bolsters
Judge Edwards’ point that ideological disagreement does not
drive, or detract from, collegiality. 174 That a panel broke
along an ideological divide was not a statistically significant
predictor of an expression of collegiality in dissent being
more, or less, likely. And neither a court’s ideological
homogeneity nor the ideological homogeneity of the
geographic region covered by the court correlated with fewer
expressions of collegiality in dissent. However, the evidence
does not support Judge Edwards’ assertion that collegiality
is inversely correlated with a court’s dissent rate. 175 Nor does
the evidence support Judge Edwards’ argument that the
courts of appeals are more collegial bodies than the Supreme
Court. 176 Rather, as Professors Cross and Tiller have argued
and as I hypothesized, the Supreme Court exhibits more
collegiality, at least on this measure. 177

174. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
175. See supra notes 14, 19, and accompanying text.
176. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
177. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
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CONCLUSION
In this Article, I have introduced meaningful, tractable
measures of judicial collegiality. Empirical investigation
using the measures reveals that collegiality is not function of
ideological differences, that judges are more likely to exhibit
collegiality in published opinions—i.e., when there is more of
a spotlight on their actions. At the court level, the Supreme
Court seems more collegial than the federal courts of
appeals. This is likely a function of the Supreme Court
hearing all cases with the same group of judges and having
all judges based in the same courthouse. Finally, empirical
analysis indicates that lower dissent rates are not correlated
with higher levels of expressed collegiality. Rather, courts
with fewer judges, and judges housed in fewer courthouses,
are more likely to be collegial courts.

